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REVIEW OF REAL ESTATE ASSESSMENTS-COOK
COUNTY (CHICAGO) vs. REMAINDER
OF ILLINOIS
By Alan S. Ganz* and Dixie L. Laswell**
"The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least possible amount
of hissing."t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although much has been written in the area of real estate
tax assessments, 1 there has been no discussion of the differing
treatment afforded Cook County taxpayers, whose property is
located within the City of Chicago and surrounding suburbs, and
taxpayers in the remaining 101 counties of Illinois ("downstate
taxpayers") concerning review of their real estate assessments.
The lack of comment in this area is surprising since real estate
taxes are the largest single revenue producers in Illinois. Approximately $1.5 billion in real estate taxes were collected in
Cook County in 1975.2 The downstate counties collected approx* Alan S. Ganz, B.A. Wabash College 1954; LL.B. Harvard University, 1959. Mr. Ganz was the taxpayer's counsel in LaSalle National Bank
v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974).
*

* Dixie L. Laswell, B.A. Colorado 1970; J.D. The John Marshall

Law School 1975.

t Jean Baptiste Colbert, Superintendent of Finance during the reign
of Louis XIV, King of France.

1. Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in Cook County Under the
Constitution of 1970, 6 J. MAR. J. 87 (1973); Young, Taxpayers' Remedies,
1952 U. ILL. L.F. 248; Comment, Application of Declaratory Judgment Act
in Tax Cases, 40 ILL. B.J. 5315 (1952); Comment, Real Property Taxation
in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 481; Comment, Notice and Hearing Before Assessment Increases, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 150; Comment, Classification for
Purposes of Equalization of Assessments by Board of Review, 1955 U. ILL.

L.F. 343.

2. Real estate taxes collected in Cook County for the years 1970
through 1975 were as follows:
Gross Amount of Real Estate
Taxes Collected Excluding
Tax Year
Railroad Properties
1970
$1,214,617,378
1971
1,369,690,311
1972
1,433,051,180
1973
1,473,756,159
1974
1,489,796,473
1975
1,539,677,391
(Subject to increase by
delinquency collections
in progress)
Oral communication from Walter Krawiec, Deputy County Treasurer, to
Alan S. Ganz (Jan. 24, 1977) in response to letter from Alan S. Ganz to

Walter Krawiec (Nov. 29, 1977).
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imately $682 million in 1973, the latest tax year for which this
3
information is available.
These figures are to be contrasted to the two other primary
sources of revenue production, the income tax and the sales tax.
In 1976 approximately $1.7 billion in revenue was generated by
4
The sales tax,
the income tax for the entire State of Illinois.
for the calendar year 1975, generated approximately $767 million
3. The most current information pertaining to the collection of real
estate taxes in the downstate counties for the tax years 19'71 through
1975 is as follows:
Tax Year
1971 - $569,259,322
647,966,728
1972 682,177,027
1973 Data not available due to incomplete
1974 compilation and submission of county
abstracts.
Data currently unavailable for this
1975 tax year.
Letter from Jean H. Hostetler, Illinois Department .of Local Government
Affairs, to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 13, 1976).
4. Information concerning the amount of income tax collected in
each county is not available. The following table indicates the total
amount of income tax collected for the years 1971 through 1976 with a
breakdown by classification of taxpayer:
STATE FISCAL
YEAR
TOTAL
AMOUNT
TAXPAYER
YEAR
$827,045,000
Individual
1971
183,148,000
Corporate
Fiduciary
Adjustments
$1,010,193,000
914,109,000
Individual
1972
222,232,000
Corporate
Fiduciary
Adjustments
$1,136,341,000
996,389,000
Individual
1973
249,357,000
Corporate
4,215,000
Fiduciary
(261,000)
Adjustments
$1,249,700,000
1,140,012,000
Individual
1974
277,144,000
Corporate
4,002,000
Fiduciary
(436,000)
Adjustments
$1,420,722,000
1,248,156,000
Individual
1975
319,681,000
Corporate
3,617,000
Fiduciary
(896,000)
Adjustments
$1,570,559,000
1,322,077,000
Individual
1976
342,289,000
Corporate
3,945,000
Fiduciary
(658,000)
Adjustments
$1,667,653,000
Letters from Thomas R. McGee, Illinois Department of Revenue to Alan
S. Ganz (Dec. 7, 1976 and Dec. 13, 1976).
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in the downstate counties and $698 million in Cook County. '
Thus it can be seen that real estate taxes in Cook County and
the downstate counties, when considered either alone or in comparison with the other large revenue producing taxes, place a
substantial burden on the Illinois taxpayer.
Currently there exists a dichotomy in the State of Illinois
with respect to real estate assessment review procedures. Considered in light of the enormous dollar figures involved in the
collection of real estate taxes and the concomitant burden on the
taxpayer, it would seem appropriate that whatever the procedure
used, it should incorporate a provision for meaningful judicial
review. However, this is not the case in Cook County for which
the Illinois General Assembly has enacted statutory procedures
markedly distinct from the downstate counties. A comparison of
the basic dissimilarities in the assessment procedures and access
to judicial review will provide the focal point for this article.
In addition, the doctrine of constructive fraud as it restricts
judicial review of real estate assessments in Cook County and
possibly for downstate taxpayers will be discussed extensively.
Finally, suggestions will be made for changes in the existing
Cook County real estate assessment review system.
II.

REVIEW OF REAL ESTATE ASSESSMENTS IN
COOK COUNTY

1. Classificationof Real Property-1970Illinois Constitution
The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides in article IX, section
4:
REAL PROPERTY TAXATION
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon
real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained
as the General Assembly shall provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly
may hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of
more than 200,000 may classify or to [sic] continue to classify
real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification
shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each
class. The level of assessment or rate of tax of the highest class
5. Combined receipts from the Retailers Occupation Tax, Service
Occupation Tax, and Use Tax for the calendar years 1973 through 1975
were as follows:
Total of
Cook
Calendar
Remaining Counties
Year
County
1973
1974
1975

$607,568,818.42
669,721,804.66
698,113,323.91

$619,316,114.94
704,258,868.65
767,393,082.11

Letter from Thomas R. McGee, Illinois Department of Revenue, to Alan
S. Ganz (Dec. 7, 1976).
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in a county shall not exceed two and one-half times the level of
assessment or rate of tax of the lowest class in that county. Real
property used in farming in a county shall not be assessed at
a higher level of assessment than single family residential real
property in that county.
(c) Any depreciation in the value of real estate occasioned
by a public easement may be deducted in assessing such property.

It is noteworthy that counties which do not fall within the coverage of article IX, section 4(b) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
cannot classify property for purposes of taxation. The right of
Cook County to classify real estate for purposes of taxation was
challenged for five separate reasons including violations of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has
unanimously upheld Cook County's right to classify.6
Although the Cook County Board of Commissioners is the
only body authorized by statute 7 to classify real estate, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook,8 held
that in the absence of legislation the Assessor of Cook County
could also classify real estate for taxation purposes. However,
both the Assessor and the Board of Appeals of Cook County must
comply with the present county ordinance 9 which has divided all
county real estate into five assessment classifications and affixed
a market value percentage for each classification. 10
6. People ex rel. Kutner v. Cullerton, 58 Ill. 2d 266, 319 N.E.2d 55
(1974).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501a (1975).
8. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d
252 (1974).
9. The ordinance passed by the Cook County Board of Commissioners to be applied in 1974 provides in part: "Section 3. The Assessor
shall assess, and the Board of Appeals shall review assessments on real
estate in various classes at the following percentages of market value."
Cook County, Ill.,
Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance § 3
(originally enacted Dec. 17, 1973, amended Nov. 29, 1976, June 6, 1977).
10. The ordinance passed by the Cook County Board of Commissioners to be applied in 1974 provides in part:
Percentage
of Market
Classes
Value
Class 1: Unimproved real estate.
22%
Class 2: Real estate used as a farm, or real estate used for
residential purposes when improved with a house,
an apartment building of not more than six living
units, or residential condominium, a residential cooperative or a government-subsidized housing project if required by statute to be assessed in the
lowest assessment category.
17%
Class 3: All improved real estate used for residential purposes which is not included in Class 2.
33%
Class 4: Real estate owned and used by a not-for-profit corporation in furtherance of the purposes set forth in

Review of Real Estate Assessments

1977]

2.
(a)

Board of Appeals

What is it?

Cook County real estate is initially assessed by the Assessor.1' The next step in the assessment process is the Board
of Appeals which consists of two commissioners, each elected for
a four-year term. 1 2 The primary function of the Board of Appeals is to review taxpayer complaints which invariably allege
overassessments.
Until 1932, Cook County had a Board of Review with powers
significantly greater than the current Board of Appeals. Although a Board of Review still exists for downstate counties, a
statutory amendment was passed in 1932 which eliminated the
Board of Review for Cook County and established in its place
the Board of Appeals. The legislative history of the Board of
Appeals was traced by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1933 in
People ex rel. Thomas v. Nixon. 13 This case involved a writ of
mandamus against the Board of Appeals. Upon the complaint
of a real estate owner, without a hearing and without notice to
the Assessor, the Board of Appeals had entered an order directing
the Assessor to reduce by 15% the base price on which assessments were made for all cottages, bungalows, residences and two
and three-flat buildings. The relator contended that the Board
of Appeals' order was illegal. The respondent argued that section 34 of the Revenue Act of 1898 allowed such action. The court
awarded the writ concluding that although a Board of Review
had the power to increase or reduce the entire assessment on its
own, the Board of Appeals of Cook County could only, upon a
complaint of a taxpayer, act upon the overassessment, under14
assessment or exemption of a particular parcel of property.
This interpretation was confirmed by the General Assembly during the 1933 Session by the addition of a paragraph to section
35a 15 which stated:

Class 5:

its charter unless used for residential purposes. If
such real estate is used for residential purposes it
shall be classified in the appropriate residential
class.
All real estate not included in any of the above
four classes.

30%
40%

Cook County, Ill., Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, §§
2-3 (originally enacted Dec. 17, 1973, amended Nov. 29, 1976).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 487, 511 (1975).

12. Id. § 492.

13. 353 Ill. 556, 187 N.E. 650 (1933).

14. Id. at 564-65, 187 N.E. at 653. The present statutory section similar to the one quoted regarding Boards of Review can be found in ILL.
See also People ex rel. Gill v.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 589(5) (1975).
Jastrowb, 367 Ill. 348, 11 N.E.2d 368 (1937).

15. Currently codified in ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 120, § 594 (1975).
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The board of appeals shall hear complaints- and revise assessments of any particular parcel of real property or the assessment of personal property of any person or corporation mentioned or described in a complaint filed with the board and conforming to the requirements of section 35b of this Act and shall
make revisions in no other cases-.16
The distinction between the powers of a Board of Review and
the Board of Appeals is significant for a taxpayer, depending on
which board he is subject to. A Board of Review, applicable to
downstate taxpayers, can act on its own 17 or upon a complaint
of a taxpayer regarding over or underassessed real estate.' 8
Thus it can take into account its own ex parte investigation in
arriving at an assessment.' 9 However, the Board of Appeals cannot act on an alleged over or underassessment unless there is a
complaint filed for that particular parcel of real property. Moreover, the Board of Appeals does not ordinarily make assessments
20
but only reviews them.
What then is the nature of the Board of Appeals? Although
the precise nature remains uncertain it has been referred to as a
quasi-judicial body. 21

One recent Illinois court opined:

".

.

. the

legislature has vested appellants Board of Appeals . . . with the
power to decide the property rights of others, a power which
when exercised makes their official actions judicial. . . However, when considered in relation to the circuit court, the Board
-22
of Appeals is an inferior tribunal ....
(b)

Complaints to the Board of Appeals

A taxpayer could become involved with the Board of Appeals
in three ways. First, the taxpayer could file a complaint with
the Board of Appeals stating that his real estate is overassessed.23
Second, he could request a certificate of correction of the Assessor and the certificate could be acted upon by the Assessor.
Thereafter, if the Board of Appeals has not completed its work,
it could approve the forwarded certificate of correction, for errors
other than a mistake of judgment, and order the Assessor to cor16. Id. § 35(a) (1933)

(emphasis added).

17. Id.§§ 508, 589,(4) (5) (19715).
18. Id. § 589(4).
19. Budberg v. County of Sangamon, 4 Ill. 2d 518, 522, 123 N.E.2d 479,
482 (1955); People ex rel. Bracher v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 562, 139 N.E.
113, 116 (1923); Earl & Wilson v. Raymond, 188 Ill. 15, 59 N.E. 19 (1908).
20. Goodfriend 'v. Board of Appeals, 18 Ill. App. 3d 412, 305 N.E.2d

404 (1973). However, the Board of Appeals could assess real estate
which had not been assessed at all. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 602 (1975).
21. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 136, 164 N.E.
2d 517, 521 (1960); Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 350, 18 N.E.2d
209, 214 (1939).
22. Goodfriend v. Board of Appeals, 18 Ill. App. 3d 412, 418, 305 N.E.
2d 404, 409 (1973).
23. ILL. REV. STAT; ch. 120, §§ 594(1), 597, 598 (1975).
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rect the assessment books. 24 Finally, after the Board of Appeals
completes its work and the assessment books are certified but
before judgment is rendered on the County Collector's application for judgment to collect the taxes, a certificate of error may
be initiated by the Assessor. 25 Of these three alternatives the
taxpayer's valuation complaint is by far the most popular process
by which grievances are brought before the Board of Appeals.
(i)

Taxpayer's Valuation Complaints

A taxpayer can file a complaint that his real property is overassessed, underassessed or exempt.26 The complaint must be
filed on the form prescribed by the Board of Appeals 27 with a
separate complaint being filed for each parcel of real estate bearing a permanent real estate tax number. 28 In addition, a schedule of all beneficial owners of property held in a land trust must
be attached to the complaint. 29 Should any of the information
requested on the form not be furnished, the complaint may be
30
dismissed.
24. Id. § 603.

25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 604 (1975) as amended by P. A. 80-158
(Aug. 1, 1977). Upon endorsement by the Assessor, or when endorsed
by the Assessor and the Board of Appeals if the certificate was executed
pursuant to a taxpayer complaint filed in the Board of Appeals for that
tax year, the certificate may be received into evidence by the court.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 594(1), 597, 598 (1975).
27. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 1. The Board of Appeals shall receive and hold hearings on
complaints of property owners who claim their property is over assessed by the Assessor of Cook County, when such complaints are
filed in apt time on complete and correct official complaint forms
prescribed by the Board.
RULE 2. The Board of Appeals does hereby adopt the complaint
form inserted in the official minutes of the meeting of the Board held
on September 13, 1976 as the official complaint form for over valuation complaints on real estate assessed valuations assessed for 1976
by the Assessor of Cook County and hereby authorizes its personnel
to distribute and make available said form to qualified complainants
and their attorneys.
28. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 7. A separate set of complaint forms must be filed for each
Permanent Index Number on which a property owner desires to
complain. Two or more Index Numbers cannot be combined on one
set of complaint forms even though only one building may be involved.
29. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 11. Complaints may be signed by the property owner or his
attorney. An individual property owner may act as his own attorney at the hearing on his complaint on his property only. A person
who is not an attorney cannot represent complainants before the
Board. Except for individual complainants all other complainants
including corporations must be represented by an attorney. A
schedule of all beneficial owners of property held in a land trust,
signed by the trustee, must be attached to the complaint.
30. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
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Taxpayers shall have at least twenty days to file their complaints after the Board of Appeals publishes notice;3 1 however,
a taxpayer should be able to file his complaint prior to the commencement of the twenty day period inasmuch as the statute
provides for filing on or before the publication dates.3 2 Furthermore, in proceedings conducted pursuant to a complaint, individual taxpayers may represent themselves but all others must be
33
represented by an attorney.
(ii)

Third-Party Taxpayer Valuation Complaints

While any taxpayer may file a complaint on any parcel
of real estate with the Board of Appeals contending that it is
overassessed, underassessed or exempt,3 4 a taxing body is precluded from similar recourse. This prohibition is based upon
a statute which expressly limits the filing of complaints to
taxpayers and not taxing bodieg.3
Thus taxing bodies are not
at liberty to complain to the Board of Appeals with respect to
cases involving underassessments.
RULE 8. Complete and correct information required to complete the
complaint form must be furnished and set forth on the form. Failure
to comply with this rule may render a complaint void and unacceptable for filing.
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 596 (1975).
32. Id. § 598. The Board of Appeals Rules are in conflict with the
statute.
RULE 10. A complaint shall be filed with the Board of Appeals
within the time specified in the official publication of the Board of
Appeals for the township in which the property identified in the
complaint is located. No complaints shall be accepted for filing either before or after the official filing period for the township. The
Board shall also post in its office the opening and closing dates for
filing for each of the 38 townships in Cook County as soon as such
dates are determined and published and shall also make such information available to all interested persons.
Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. Id. § 598. The use of underassessment complaints by taxpayers
appears to be non-existent. No information is available as to the number
of underassessment complaints filed with the Board of Appeals or as to
the number of assessments increased as the result of an under assessment
complaint. Letter from Donald Erskine, -Chief Deputy of the Board of
Appeals, to Alan S. Ganz (Nov. 19, 1976).
One of the reasons for the lack of underassessment complaints might
be that the complaining taxpayer must conform with Rule 9 of the 1976
Official Rules of the Board of Appeals of Cook County on Under Assessment Complaints which states:
At the hearing the complainant shall have the burden of proof and
of proceeding with his complaint by supporting the allegations set
forth therein with acceptable facts and documentation. Only thereafter shall the respondent have the burden to rebut such facts and
documentation. A complaint shall not be deemed to have been well
taken unless so supported and shall be forthwith dismissed failing
such offer of proof.
Under Assessment Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County
Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976).
35. People ex rel. McDonough v. Marshall Field & Co., 355 Ill. 633,
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(c)
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Hearing Before the Board of Appeals

A complainant has a right to a hearing on his complaint
or one filed by a third-party taxpayer concerning complainant's
real estate.3 6 Should the Board of Appeals refuse to grant a
hearing, a writ of mandamus will issue requiring a hearing to be
held.3 7 Regardless of whether the hearing is procured through
standard procedure or by writ of mandamus, a taxpayer is
entitled to notification in writing of the hearing.3 8 Such hearings normally take place on the day indicated in the taxpayer's
notification;3 9 however, continuances are possible although not
40
easily procured.
Hearings of the Board of Appeals are open to the public4 1
and the records of the Board pertaining to the hearing are public
records with the exception of portions of income tax returns
not relevant to the subject real estate. 42 In addition, copies
of these public records will be furnished upon payment of a fee.
Although the hearings are conducted by commissioners of the
Board of Appeals, a deputy member of the board may conduct

636, 189 N.E. 885, 886-87 (1934); People ex rel. Thomas v. Nixon, 353 Ill.
556, 187 N.E. 650 (1933).

36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 594 (1975).
37. People ex rel. Brittain v. Outwater, 360 Ill. 621, 196 N.E. 835
(1935); People ex rel Ahlschlager v. Board of Review, 352 Ill. 157, 185
N.E. 248 (1933); Loewenthal v. People ex rel. Raymond, 192 Ill. 222, 61
N.E. 462 (1901); People ex rel. Courshon v. Hircshfield, 43 Ill. App. 3d
432, 357 N.E.2d 673 (1976); County Treasurer v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, 766, 326 N.E.2d 120, 129-30 (1975); Korzen
v. Hoffman, 20 Ill. App. 3d 531, 534, 314 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1974).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 597, 599 (1975).
39. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook
County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 3. All complaints shall be filed and hearings on complaints
shall be held in the office of the Board, Room 601, County Building,
118 No. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois. Hearings on complaints shall
be held at the times and on the dates set by the Board. The Board
shall notify the complainant or his attorney of the time and date of
the hearing.
RULE 4. A complainant or his attorney shall be ready to proceed
to hearing at the time and on the date specified in the notice of hearing.
40. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook
County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 5. No continuance of a hearing will be granted except for
good cause shown. Failure of a complainant or his attorney to appear as notified will result in the dismissal of the complaint unless
good cause is shown.
RULE 13. Where special circumstances require, the Board may by
public announcement made at the time and place of hearings continue hearings and all persons interested in such hearings shall take
notice of such continuances without further notice.
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 595, 599 (1975).
42. Id. § 595.
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preliminary hearings. "' In addition, witnesses may be put under
oath4 4 and since no court reporter is provided or official mechanical record kept of what transpires at the hearing by the Board
of Appeals, a complainant may provide his own court reporter
or mechanical record.
At the hearing, the initial document to be considered by the
Board of Appeals is the taxpayer's complaint. The complaint
may be supported by appraisals, photographs of the real estate
or documentation pertaining to a recent sale of the property.
More detailed information may be presented if income producing
property is involved. 45 Normally the only evidence that will be
heard will be that of the protesting taxpayer since the Assessor
is not required to testify in the hearing before the Board of Appeals in connection with a complaint. However, the Assessor
may be summoned to explain his method of ascertaining the
assessed valuation4 and in lieu of his presence, the Board of Appeals has access to a copy of his file for its information. In addition to the taxpayer and the Assessor, the Board of Appeals may
also hear any taxpayer in opposition to a proposed reduction in
47
any assessment.
During the course of its review, the Board of Appeals must
adhere to the same percentage levels of market value as the Assessor. 48 However, while both the Assessor and the Board of
43. Id. §§ 599, 601. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 12. As provided by statute a complainant may be assigned
to a Deputy Member of the Board of Appeals for preliminary hearing. The Deputy will receive and examine the facts and the exhibits
offered in support of the complainant.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 601 (1975).
45. Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Board of Appeals of Cook
County Official Rules (Sept. 13, 1976) provides in part:
RULE 15. In addition to the information required on the complaint
form the following documents may be submitted to support complainants request for revision: (a) qualified appraisals, (b) photographs of property, (c) recent sale of property.
For income producing property, the complainants, in addition to the
above. may present: (d) a written brief setting out complainant's
theory for valuation adjustment, (e) financial statements setting out
all income and expenses for the latest three years attested to by an
accountant or auditor, (f) if (e) is not available, then income tax returns for the latest three years prior to the filing date, (g) any additional documentation that the complainant deems has a bearing on
the fair market value of the property.
46. Information is unavailable as to the precise number of times, if
any, that the Board has required anyone from the Assessor's Office to
appear pursuant to proceedings under Chapter 120, Section 607, of the Illinois Revised Statutes during the past two tax years. Letter from Donald Erskine to Alan S. Ganz (Nov. 19, 1976).
47. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 599 (1975).
48. The ordinance passed by the Cook County Board of Commissioners to be applied in 1974 provides in part: "Section 3. The Assessor
shall assess, and the Board of Appeals shall review assessments on real
estate in various classes at the following percentages of market value."
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Appeals are required to jointly make and prescribe rules and
regulations for the assessment of property,4 9 only the Assessor
has done so. It is noteworthy that the only rules pertaining to
the Board of Appeals are those previously quoted and even these
were not jointly proclaimed with the Assessor. The end result
of this conspicuous absence of governing rules in a Board of Appeals proceeding is that the taxpayer's burden of proof is unknown.
On what then, should the Board of Appeals base its decision? Should it give presumptive weight to the Assessor's
decision? Should it consider only the evidence presented by
Should it consider its own experience and
the taxpayer?
possibly ex parte contacts? 0 One former member of the Board
of Appeals opined that the Board could do anything it wanted
with reference to its hearings.5 ' However, the former member
is wrong in his interpretation of court decisions involving
Boards of Review which are cited as authority for his position.
As previously discussed, the statutory powers of a Board of
Review and the Board of Appeals are very different.
As has been stated, the Board of Appeals has been referred
to as being quasi-judicial or judicial in nature. Does this status
require the Board in conducting a hearing to comply with
judicial standards? Rule 61 of the Illinois Supreme Court proCook County, Ill., Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance
(Dec. 17, 1976).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 494 (1975).
50. In response to an inquiry by Alan S. Ganz as to the duties of "Prehearing Investigators" and "Field Investigators" (positions provided for
by the 1976 budget of the Board of Appeals), Donald E. Erskine, Chief
Deputy of the Board of Appeals furnished the following job summary:
Inspects and fully investigates, by physical examination and observation, real property, building constructions and construction cost to
determine its neighborhood influences. Assesses the value of the
real property and buildings for tax purposes. Evaluates neighborhood influences on the real property and buildings assessed. Compiles a comprehensive report to aid Board Personnel in adjudicating
real estate valuations and exemption complaints or for purposes of
re-evaluation for Board determination of fair and just assessment according to law.
Letter from Donald E. Erskine to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 6, 1976). It thus
seems that ex parte contacts of investigations are being used by the
Board of Appeals in arriving at its decisions.
51. Keane, Real Estate Assessment and Appeal Procedure, 40 CHI. B.
REc. 205-06 (1959).
The decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court

relating to matters which came before the Board and came before
those courts on appeal, would seem to give the Board of Appeals almost unlimited authority to do anything and everything that it
wanted to do. The decisions have said that the Board of Appeals can
make changes based purely upon its own knowledge and information, without any evidence; that the Board need not take evidence
under oath; that the Board need not document the reasons that persuaded it to make a change; that it need not keep any records with
respect to any change which has been made.
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hibits ex parte communications;;5 2 however, the Board of Appeals continues in this practice. This may seem to indicate that
the Board of Appeals is only judicial or quasi-judicial in nature
for limited purposes such as appearances before it which constitute the practice of law53 or for the very limited judicial review
of its decisions. However, this is mere conjecture. The precise
standards to which the conduct of the Board of Appeals must
comport remain unknown because neither the courts nor the
legislature have provided any guidance as to this subject.
A decision, whatever the standards used, must be made by
both commissioners of the Board of Appeals. If an assessment
is corrected, the Board of Appeals must make and sign a brief
written statement containing the reason for such change and the
manner in which the method used by the Assessor in making such
assessment was erroneous.54 The Board of Appeals will then notify the complainants of changes in assessments; however, no notification is sent with respect to unchanged assessments.
(d)

Workload of Assessor, Board of Appeals and Courts

The beginning of an analysis of the complaint workload
imposed on the various components of the real estate assessment
review hierarchy starts with the Assessor. Before the assessment
books are completed and verified, a taxpayer may file a complaint.555 The Assessor publishes a schedule of dates on which
he Will hear complaints concerning real estate assessments from
one or more townships or taxing districts after the assessment
books have been completed. ', Assessments can be revised pursuant to complaints until the Assessor completes his revisions and
corrections, enters them in the assessment books and affixes his
affidavit as required by law.5 7 Approximately 10,000 complaints
concerning real property assessments are received by the Assessor each tax year.5 8
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 61(16) (1975).
Supreme Court Rule
61 in pertinent part states:
(16) Ex Parte Communications. Except as permitted by law, a
judge should not permit private or ex parte interviews, arguments
or communications designed to influence his judicial action in any
case, either civil or criminal.
A judge should not accept in any case briefs, documents or written communications intended or calculated to influence his action
unless the contents are promptly made known to all parties.
53. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N.E.2d
517 (1960).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 599 (1975). As a matter of practice, no
written decision is rendered. Only a reduced assessment figure is given.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 578 (1975).
56. Id. § 579.
57. Id. § 578.
58. The number of complaints received by the Assessor for tax years
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In addition to the complaint, two other methods by which
a taxpayer can obtain relief are by means of either a certificate
of correction or a certificate of error. The Assessor, for the tax
year 1974, signed 524 certificates of correction before the Board
of Appeals completed its work 5" and for the tax year 1975, signed
8,800 certificates of error after the Board of Appeals completed
its work and before judgment was rendered on the Cook County
Collector's Application for Judgment.6 °
If a taxpayer disagrees with the Assessor's decision concerning his assessment, his next step is to file a complaint with the
Board of Appeals. The workload of the Board of Appeals in hearing taxpayer complaints is substantial. For example, in 1975,
approximately 22,000 complaints were filed 61 resulting in reductions of approximately $234 million.6 2 The Board of Ap1973 through 1976 were as follows: 1973-9,893; 1974-9,989; 1975-10,064;
1976-12,400. Letter from Theodore M. Swain, Chief Deputy Assessor, to

Alan S. Ganz (Oct. 29, 1976). No records are maintained as to the num-

ber of complaints filed with respect to assessments on property in each
of the five assessment classes. There is no available information on the
total dollar amount of the real estate involved in the complaints or on
the total dollar amount of any resulting assessment reductions for each
class of property. The Chief Deputy Assessor has estimated that about
20% of the appeals are initiated by homeowners and that 60-70% of all
appeals are successful in whole or in part. Letter from Theodore M.
Swain, Chief Deputy Assessor, to Alan S. Ganz (Oct. 29, 1976).
59. The number of Certificates of Correction signed by the Assessor
pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 603 (1975) and the number of Certificates of Error signed by the Assessor pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120 § 604 (1975) for the tax years 1970 through 1975 is as follows:
Certificates of Correction
Certificates Error
1970
1971
1972
1973

-

1,446
unknown
717
839

1974

-

524

1975

-

unknown

1970
1971
1972
1973

-

1974

-

4,000 Real Estate

1975

-

4,400 Real Estate

2,300
1,800
11,800
15,700 Real Estate

4,300 Homestead
5,800 Homestead

(approx.)

4,000 Homestead
(approx.)
Letter from Daniel Peirce, Legal Counsel to the Cook County Assessor's
Office, to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 23, 1976).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 604 (1975). See note 59 supra.
61. The total number of complaints filed each year for the tax years
1970 through 1975 are as follows:
Tax Year
Complaints Filed
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

-

-

13,496
10,311
16,306
15,956
20,090
22,262

Reply from Donald E. Erskine, Chief Deputy of the Board of Appeals,
to letter from Alan S. Ganz (July 27, 1976).
62. The total assessed value reductions rendered by the Board of
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peals' decision with respect to these complaints is binding on the
Assessor and determinative of the taxpayer's assessment for the
tax year that the complaint relates to in the absence of action
by the circuit court.6" Unfortunately there is no breakdown of
the number of complaints that received reductions or the type
of real estate receiving assessment reductions. In addition, the
Board of Appeals may also act on certificates of error. Inasmuch
as the Board is comprised of only two commissioners and seven
deputies who are charged with hearing this sizable number of
complaints, it becomes readily apparent that the time demands
upon this quasi-judicial instrumentality are great.
The final step of the taxpayer's preappellate review is the
Circuit Court of Cook County wherein his objection to the Collector's Application for Judgment is heard. One judge is assigned
to hear all Cook County taxpayers' objections based upon
excessive assessed valuations of real estate. For the tax year
4
1975 there were approximately 1,000 of such objections filed.
Although no statistics are available as to the success of these
objections, 6"this figure may be indicative of a disinclination on
the part of Cook County taxpayers to resort to this procedure
to remedy purported overvaluations.
Appeals for each of the tax years 1970 through 1975 were as follows:
Tax Year
Value Reductions

1970
1971
1972

-

$82,258,264

-

98,627,646

73,620,455

1973
121,268,078
1974
237,846,577
1975
234,102,218
Letter from Donald E. Erskine, Chief Deputy of the Board of Appeals,
to Alan S. Ganz (July 27, 1976). It is interesting to note that while the

total number of hours of hearing time spent in any one tax year is unavailable, the average cost per complaint.was $28.86 for the tax year 1975
of the Board of Appeals. Board of Appeals expenditures for the tax year
1975 were $642,500.44, while 22,262 complaints were filed for 1975 taxes.
Letter from Donald E. Erskine, Chief Deputy of the Board of Appeals,

to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 6, 1976).

63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 578 (1975).
64. Tax Year
Complaints
1975
951
1974
1,051
1973
756
1972
535
1971
336
1970
155 (approx.)
1969
80 (approx.)
1968
45 (approx.)
Interview with Judge Robert J. Dempsey, Circuit Court of Cook County,
in Chicago, Illinois (July 6, 1976).

65. No statistics are available as to the number of objectors receiving
reductions, dollar volume of assessment reductions, or the dollar volume
of assessment reductions by class as set forth in the Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance. Interview with Judge Robert J. Dempsey, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois (Dec. 1, 1976).
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JudicialReview of Board of Appeals Actions

(e)

The Administrative Review Act 6 is not applicable to hearings before the Board of Appeals;6 7 nor can Cook County
under its home rule powers"8 provide for the method of judicial
review. The only judicial review available to a Cook County taxpayer to correct actions of the Board of Appeals is a writ of certiorari, and this writ is only applicable in two very limited factual
situations. The first situation is when the Board of Appeals exceeds its jurisdiction and the second situation is when the Board
of Appeals has proceeded illegally."9 The lack of taxpayer success through the use of this writ is reflected by the fact that
there has been only one reported case wherein a writ was granted
and this case concerned the illegal increase of assessments pursuant to a certificate of correction.
As a result of severely limited judicial review, the issue of
the quality of a Board of Appeals' hearing and the type of evidence that can be heard is of philosophical interest but of no
practical import except to the complainant. The Board of Appeals can give the most perfunctory hearing using ex parte contacts and the taxpayer has no way to correct the situation. Since
there are no statutory provisions or judicial decisions prescribing
standards for hearings, the taxpayer is totally reliant upon the
good faith and competency of the members of the Board of Appeals rather than having statutory or decisional safeguards.
3.
(a)

Judicial Review of Real Estate Assessments

Prerequisitesand Nature of the Action

Judicial review is concerned with the amount of the assessment in relation to the property's market value and the applicable assessment level. This can be an assessment fixed by the
Assessor and not modified by the Board of Appeals or an assessment modified by the Board of Appeals. The review is thus of
the assessment and tangentially of the Assessor's or Board of
Appeals' actions.
In order to properly file a suit questioning an assessment,
certain prerequisites must be met. The protesting taxpayer must
file a complaint with the Board of Appeals, have a hearing and
obtain a decision. 70 The Illinois Supreme Court, in a revenue
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 264 (1975).

67. White v. Board of Appeals, 45 Ill. 2d 378, 259 N.E.2d 51 (1970).
68. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970). See Cummings v. Daley, 58
Ill. 2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 22 (1974); Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 57
Ill. 2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974).
69. Goodfriend v. Board of Appeals, 18 Ill. App. 3d 412, 418, 305
N.E.2d 404, 409 (1973).
70. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton Mkt. Cold Storage Co., 62 Ill. 2d
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case, has given as the rationale for this rule that (1) it allows
full development of the facts before the agency; (2) it allows
the agency an opportunity to utilize its expertise; and (3) the
aggrieved party may succeed before the agency, rendering judicial review unnecessary.7 1 Therefore, if the Board of Appeals
fails or refuses to grant a taxpayer a hearing, he should mandamus it and obtain his hearing or suffer the denial of judicial
72
review of his assessment.
After the taxpayer has obtained a decision from the Board
of Appeals, he next faces a second necessary step in his quest
for judicial review. Real estate taxes are payable in two installments. For Cook County taxpayers, the first installment is an
estimated one.7 3

The taxpayer cannot pay this installment under

protest except in two situations which are not relevant to this
analysis. 4 A Cook County taxpayer must pay the second installment in full and at that time is required to file a written assessed valuation protest, the form of which is set forth in the
statute.75 The written protest need not be perfect in form to
be legally sufficient.7 6 The payment in full of the first and second installments, with the proper written protest being filed with
the second payment are both preconditions to potential further
77
successful judicial review of the assessment.
After the payment under written protest with the second
installment of real estate taxes, the taxpayer must wait for action
by the Collector of Cook County. The Collector, at any time
after the first day of September next after all of delinquent taxes
on lands and lots shall become due in any year, or next after
any taxes are paid under protest in any year, must publish an
advertisement, giving notice of his intended application for judg443, 343 N.E.2d 450 (1976); In re County Treasurer, 35 Ill. App. 3d 449,
342 N.E.2d 249 (1976); In re County Treasurer, 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, 326
N.E.2d 120 (1975); In re Korzen, 20 Ill. App. 3d 531, 314 N.E.2d 593
(1974).
71. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737
(1975).
72. People ex rel. Brittain v. Outwater, 360 Ill. 621 (1935); People ex
rel. Ahlschlager v. Board of Review, 352 Ill. 157, 185 N.E. 248 (1933);
Loewenthal v. People, 192 Ill. 222, 61 N.E. 462 (1901).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 705.1 (1975).
74. Id. §§ 675, 705.3.
75. rd. § 675.
76. People ex rel. Wisdom v.Chicago B. & Q.R.R. Co., 32 Ill.
2d 434,
206 N.E.2d 702 (1965); People ex rel. Anderson v. Chicago E.I.R.R. Co.,
399 Ill.
520, 78 N.E.2d 265 (1948); People ex rel. Darr v. Alton R.R. Co.,
380 Ill.
380, 43 N.E.2d 964 (1942); In re County Collector, 23 Ill. App. 3d
923, 320 N.E.2d 456 (1974).
77. In re County Collector, 42 Ill. App. 3d 895, 356 N.E.2d 844 (1976)
(Payment under protest is a prerequisite to judicial review); In re
County Collector, 23 Ill. App. 3d 923, 320 N.E.2d 456 (1974); In re County
Collector, 5 Ill. App. 3d 694, 283 N.E.2d 905 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411
U.S. 912 (1973); Burton v. Cain, 63 Ill. App. 2d 183, 211 N.E.2d 289 (1965).
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ment for sale of such delinquent lands and lots, and for judgment
fixing the correct amount of any tax paid under protest, in the
applicable newspaper. The advertisement must be published
at least ten days previous to the day on which judgment
is to be prayed and must state that the Collector will apply to
the circuit court on a specified day for judgment against the lands
and lots for the satisfaction of unpaid taxes or for a judgment
fixing the correct amount of tax paid on any real estate under
protest.78 Currently the advertisement is published in approximately forty-three local papers. The Collector includes in this
advertisement the date on which he intends to make the application for judgment. This date is initially targeted for October,
but can be later if an October date is not feasible. 7 9 The Collector must transcribe into a record, known as the tax judgment,
sale, redemption and forfeiture record, the list of delinquent
lands and lots and of lands and lots upon which taxes have been
paid under protest. This list is made out in numerical order at
least five days before the day on which application for judgment
is to be made, and contains all the information necessary to be
recorded.'4 0 This record is in effect the complaint of the Collector and is commonly known as the Collector's Application for
Judgment." '
After the Collector's Application for Judgment is filed, a taxpayer must file within the applicable time period a written specific objection, identifying the cause of the objection to the application ' 2 or his protest will be deemed waived.8 3 Attached to the
taxpayer's specific objection must be the original or a copy of
the Collector's receipt showing that all taxes objected to were
paid under protest.8 4 Unfortunately, there are no statutory
provisions or rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County regarding the time period during which an objection must be filed.
The judge hearing the matter places in the order entering the
Collector's Application for Judgment a time period in which the
taxpayer must file his objection. For 1975 taxes, the order allowed eleven days in which to file an objection. It is apparent
that counsel for a taxpayer must be extremely vigilant in following the Collector's Application for Judgment to avoid missing the
filing period.
Within ninety days after the specific objection has been filed,
the court must, unless the matter has been sooner disposed of,
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 706 (1975).

79. Id. § 710.

80. Id. § 713.
81. For an excellent discussion of the procedure, see People ex rel.

Thompson v. Clark, 34 Ill. App. 3d 228, 338 N.E.2d 408 (1975).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (1975).

83. Id. § 675.
84. Id. § 716.
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hold a conference between the objector and the State's Attorney.
If no agreement is reached at the conference, the court must,
upon the demand of either the taxpayer or the State's Attorney,
set the matter for hearing within ninety days of the demand.8
Currently, however, this procedure is not adhered to in the
Cook County Circuit Court.
Assuming no settlement is reached between the State's
Attorney and the taxpayer, the court shall hear and determine
0
the case in a summary manner, without pleadings or a jury.
Although the Circuit Court of Cook County has not interpreted this provision to in any way limit a party's rights
under the Illinois Supreme Court Rules or the Illinois Civil Practice Act, there are no appellate decisions on this issue. The court
has allowed the records of the Assessor to be subpoenaed and
his deposition to be taken; however, interrogatories served on
the Assessor are routinely stricken because the Collector, not the
Assessor, is the plaintiff. Furthermore, requests for the admission of facts are allowed concerning assessment practices, and
facts and answers or lack thereof are binding on the Collector.
In addition, all amendments may be made which, by law, could
be made in any personal action. This applies both to the taxpayer's specific objection and to the tax list and assessment rolls.
It is noteworthy, however, that the taxpayer cannot cure basic
problems such as adding parcels for which objections have not
been made.8 7 Finally, if the taxpayer is successful, the court
will order a refund;8 8 however, the taxpayer will receive no inter89
est on this refund.
The tax objection method of attacking excessive real estate
tax assessments, as described above, is legal in nature. Equitable
relief which allows the enjoining of taxes payable is allowed as
a matter of right only when the tax is unauthorized by law or
the tax is levied on exempt property. However, a taxpayer cannot maintain that a tax is unauthorized by law simply by alleging as his reason a very high assessment.9 0 In addition, equitable
relief may also be granted if a fraudulently excessive assessment
85. Id. § 675(a).
86. Id. § 716.
87. See People ex rel. Harding v. Morris, 338 Ill. 335, 170 N.E.2d 216
(1930). An interesting issue which has never been the subject of appellate review is whether a taxing body could intervene in the specific objection proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.1 (1975); see also Will
County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill. 2d 513, 517,
272 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1971).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (1975).
89. 28 East Jackson Enterprises v. Cullerton, 523 F.2d 439, 441 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Lakefront Realty Corp. v.
Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 422-23, 167 N.E.2d 236, 240-41 (1960).
90. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312
N.E.2d 252, 255 (1974).
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exists and an adequate remedy at law is not available. For all
practical purposes, the foregoing situation will seldom be found
because the courts have regarded the legal tax objection remedy
as adequate. 91
An alternate source for equitable relief may initially seem
to lie in the federal court system. This alternative is suggested
by federal court decisions which have indicated that a lack of
funds to pay real estate taxes should be grounds for equitable
relief in the Illinois courts. While this rationale may be asserted
as persuasive authority for equitable relief in state courts, recourse to the federal courts will probably be fruitless due to a
92
federal statute precluding tax injunctions.
(b)

The Doctrineof Constructive Fraud

As previously stated, 93 judicial review of real estate tax
assessments in Cook County is indirect. The Assessor's acts are
not reviewed. Also, a decision of the Board of Appeals is not
reviewable in the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative
Review Act.94 Rather, the taxpayer must pay the entire tax under protest and then file objections to the Collector's Application
for Judgment attacking the assessment.9"
91. Hoyne Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 60 Ill. 2d 84, 322 N.E.2d 833
(1974) (Equity relief allowed under very severe limitations); LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974);
Clarendon Assoc. v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1974).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) provides: "The district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." For federal cases suggesting that lack of
funds to pay real estate taxes should be grounds for equitable relief in
Illinois courts, see 28 East Jackson Enterprises v. Cullerton, 523 F.2d 439
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); 28 East Jackson Enterprises v. Rosewell, 65 Ill. 2d 420, 358 N.E.2d 1139 (1976).
93. See text accompanying notes 70-89 supra.
94. In White v. Board of Appeals, 45 Ill. 2d 378, 381, 259 N.E.2d 51,
53 (1970), the court stated that, " IT] he legislature has not made the Administrative Review Act applicable to actions of the Board of Appeals.
Thus, judicial review of a decision of the Board of Appeals is not to be
had under the Administrative Review Act."
In all counties other than Cook County, the Property Tax Appeal
Board may review decisions of the Board of Review, and final decisions
of the Property Tax Appeal Board are subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Review Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975).
Decisions of the Board of Review are not directly reviewable under the
Administrative Review Act, even though ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.1
(1975) makes Board of Review decisions directly appealable to the courts
without prior appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board. Id. ch. 110, §
264. Nowhere in the Board of Review's statutory authority are the provisions of the Administrative Review Act adopted and § 265 of that Act
provides that it "shall apply to and govern every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the
provisions of this Act." Id. § 265. Decisions of the Board of Review are
reviewable by the specific objection to the Collector's Application for
Judgment.
95. Id. ch. 120, § 716. The specific objection is a judicial remedy
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The following example illustrates some of the problems facing a Cook County real estate taxpayer. Assume that he owns
a parcel of prime vacant land and has received notice from the
Assessor that the property was assessed for the year 1975 at
$150,000 for real estate tax purposes. Assume further that the
taxpayer does not miss the publication by the Board of Appeals
of the time in which complaints can be filed and that a complaint
on the form prescribed by the Board of Appeals is filed within
the twenty days after the date the Board of Appeals published
notice. 96 Further assume that the Board of Appeals grants a
hearing, that counsel for the taxpayer establishes that the market
value of the property was not more than $100,000 and that the
difference in actual tax dollars which the taxpayer would pay
as a result of such overassessment is in excess of $6,000. 91 Then
assume that the Board of Appeals refuses to reduce the assessment. The taxpayer must thereafter pay the taxes in full accompanied by the proper written protest. 98 Assuming that the
taxpayer has paid the taxes under protest, the taxpayer still must
watch that the date upon which a specific objection to the Collector's Application for Judgment must be filed is not missed or
his protest will be deemed waived.9
Assuming that the taxpayer does not miss the filing date and files a specific objection
to the Collector's Application for Judgment, the only defenses
the taxpayer has to the Collector's Application for Judgment are
that his property was fraudulently overvalued or that the Assessor violated the applicable statutory or constitutional requirements. 10 0 Since the assumption has been that the taxpayer's
property was overassessed, what must the taxpayer show to
successfully defend against the Collector's Application for
Judgment?
available in all 102 counties. It is a defense to an action brought by the

County Collector to enter judgment on taxes paid under protest. Section
716 provides:
[N]o person shall be permitted to offer such defense unless such
writing specifying the particular cause of objection shall be accompanied by an official original or duplicate tax collector's receipt,
showing that all taxes to which objection is made have been paid under protest to the provisions of section 194 of this Act.
The taxpayer pays his taxes under protest as provided in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 120, § 675 (1975). The collector then prepares a record of all taxes
paid under protest and all delinquent taxes. Id. § 713. Defenses to the
payment of taxes are then heard by the court pursuant to § 716.
96. Id. §§ 594(1); 596-8; Over Valuation Complaints, 1976 Official
Rules of the Board of Appeals of Cook County, Rules 1, 2, 8 (Sept. 13
1976). See also text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
97. In Cook County the average tax rate is 12% of assessed value.
Forde, The Litigation of Real Estate Tax Assessments in Cook County,

1972 Trial Law. Guide 209, 210.
98. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
100. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 75 Ill. 292, 295 (1874).
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By case law, judicial review of the overvaluation of real estate for tax purposes in Cook County is available only in the case
of actual or constructive fraud.' 0 ' One commentator has classified the defenses to the Collector's Application for Judgment
*against lands for excessive valuations as follows:
(a) Actual fraud;
(b) Assessment so excessive it could not have been honestly
made;
(c) Assessment made by mere will without the exercise of judgment;
(d) Assessment arbitrarily made in disregard of recognized elements of value;
(e) Assessment made in violation of rules; and
0 2
(f) Intentional and systematic discrimination.1
The usual defenses against excessive assessment valuations
in the Collector's Application for Judgment will be the defenses
set forth in (b), (c) and (d) above. The burden of proof to establish those defenses has been characterized by one commenta04
tor as "overwhelming."' 0 3 Overvaluation alone is not enough.'
Therefore, our taxpayer must not only demonstrate that the
assessment was excessive, but also that it was made under one
or more of the aforementioned conditions. Thus our taxpayer
must show that the property was fraudulently assessed at too
high a level before the court will afford any relief whatsoever. 1° 5
101. People ex rel. Needham v.Abbott Estate, 47 Ill.
2d 491, 265 N.E.2d
612 (1970); People ex rel. Joseph v. Schoenborn, 41 Ill. 2d 302, 242 N.E.2d
147 (1968).
102. Cushman, The Judicial Review of Valuation in Illinois Property
Tax Cases, 35 ILL. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941).
103. Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in Cook County-The "Railroad Cases" and the Future of De Facto Classification, 1 J. MAR. J. 212,
226 (1968).
104. 6922 Jeffrey Apartment Bldg. Corp. v. Harding, 347 Ill. 336, 179
N.E. 881 (1932); Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237, 178 N.E. 71 (1931);
Hettler Lumber Co. v. County of Cook, 336 Ill. 645, 168 N.E. 627 (1929);
People v. Elmwood Cemetary Co., 317 Ill. 547, 148 N.E. 273 (1925); People ex rel. Thompson v. Bourne, 242 Ill. 61, 89 N.E. 690 (1909); Hulbert
v. People ex rel. Raymond, 189 Ill. 114, 5-9 N.E. 567 (1901); Keokuk &
Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, 145 Ill. 596, 34 N.E. 482 (1893); East St.
Louis Connecting Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Stookey, 119 Ill. 182, 10 N.E.
397 (1887); Gage v. Evans, 90 Ill. 569 (1878); People v. Big Muddy Iron
Co., 89 Ill. 116 (1878); Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602 (1876); Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292, 294 (1874); Spencer & Gardner

v. People, 68 Ill. 510 (1873).

105. See, e.g., People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 209,
221 N.E.2d 650 (1966), where the Court stated:
When valuation has been fraudulently made it is subject to judicial
review, but more is required for this purpose than merely showing
an overvaluation.
..e Before the conduct of the taxing authorities will be considered constructive fraud, the evidence must clearly establish that the
assessment was made in ignorance of the value of the property, or
on a judgment not based upon readily ascertainable facts, or on a designedly excessive basis.
... If property has been assessed higher than it should have
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As is readily apparent from this factual scenario, the decisions of the Assessor and Board of Appeals cannot effectively
be challenged by a taxpayer. The judicially developed rules delimiting review of real estate assessments have given the Assessor
and Board of Appeals judgmental discretion virtually protected
from judicial review. What are the reasons and bases for the
creation of such unlimited decisional discretion?
i.

Bases for the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud

The Illinois Supreme Court has decided that judicial review
of excessive assessments in Cook County may only occur if the
assessment is fraudulently excessive.1 08 The bases for the court's
refusal to review assessments absent fraud have never been explicitly explained by the court, and in its various opinions regarding the doctrine of constructive fraud, the doctrine is generally
stated without persuasive elaboration. 10 7 The decisions espousing the doctrine therefore are not easily classified and no simple
pattern appears.
been through a mere error of judgment on the part of the officers
making the valuation, the courts are powerless to rectify the error.
They can relieve only against fraud.
Id. at 211, 221 N.E.2d at 652. Accord, LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974); White v. Board of Appeals,
45 Ill. 2d 378, 259 N.E.2d 51 (1970); People ex rel. Joseph v. Schoenborn,
41 Ill. 2d 302, 242 N.E.2d 147 (1968); People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A.
Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966); People ex rel. County Collector
v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 33 Ill. 2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694
(1965); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543
(1964).
106. Hoyne Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 60 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252
(19,74); Clarendon Assoc. v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973);
Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 641
(1932).
107. People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 209, 221 N.E.2d
650 (1966); People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.
2d 233 (1966); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d 477, 202 N.E.2d
543 (1964); People ex rel. Dallas v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 26 Ill. 2d 292, 186
N.E.2d 335 (1962); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Department of Revenue, 6 Ill.
2d 278, 128 N.E.2d 722 (1955); People ex iel. Johnson v. Robison, 406 Ill.
280, 94 N.E.2d 151 (1950); People ex tel. Tennyson v. Texas Co., 406 Ill.
120, 92 N.E.2d 142 (1950); People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn, 393 Ill. 154,
65 N.E.2d 392 (1946); People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424, 63
N.E.2d 513 (1945); People ex rel. Hellyer v. Hendrickson, 373 Ill. 99, 25
N.E.2d 507 (1940); People ex rel. McGaughey v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12
N.E.2d 5 (1937); People ex rel. Harding v. Atwater, 362 Ill. 546, 1 N.E.2d
46 (1935); People ex rel. McDonough v. Chicago Union Lime Works Co.,
361 Ill. 304, 198 N.E. 1 (1935); People ex rel. McDonough v. Schmuhl, 359
Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935); People ex rel. Wangelin v. Gillespie, 358 Ill.
40, 192 N.E. 664 (1934); People ex rel. Wangelin v. St. Louis Bridge
Co., 357 Ill. 245, 191 N.E. 300 (1934); People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296 (1934); Kinderman v. Harding, 345
Ill. 237, 178 N.E. 71 (1931); Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772
(1930); People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924);
People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 300 Ill. 399, 133 N.E. 325
(1921); People ex iel. Thompson v. Bourne, 242 Ill. 61, 89 N.E. 690 (1909).
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A.

Review of Real Estate Assessments
Judicial Abstention: The Illinois Constitution of 1870

Judicial abstention from reviewing the action of assessors has
its roots in the 1870 Illinois Constitution. Article IX, section 1
of the 1870 Illinois Constitution provided:
The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be
needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his,
her or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person
or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct and not otherwise 0 8
In the earliest cases, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted
article IX, section 1 of the 1870 Constitution as a bar to judicial
review of the action of assessors except in the case of an assessor
acting fraudulently.10 9 The Illinois Supreme Court, in Spencer
& Gardner v. People,110 reasoned that "the framers of the constitution could not have contemplated any such consequences as
that a tax levy should be void, in case an assessor . . . should
make an incorrect valuation of any property."' 1
The court
went on to state:
The assessor is the officer who has been provided by the
legislature for fixing the valuation of property for the purpose
of taxation.
No appeal to any court is provided from the assessor's judgment in fixing the value of property for taxation, nor has any
express authority been conferred upon a court to revise such
valuation, or-to correct an assessment, or order a new one, or
to make a rebate of any tax.
And we are of the opinion that the power does not belong
to any court to revise the assessment made by an assessor, and
change or set aside any valuation of property made by him,
where his judgment has been honestly exercised, and upon a
right basis. To do so, would seem to be to arrogate the power
of ascertaining the value of property for taxation, which ascertainment of value, the constitution declares, shall be by some
ILL. CONST. art. IX,
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, §

108.

§ 1 (1870) (emphasis added).
20 (1818) provided "that the mode of levying
a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has in his or her possession."
ILL. CONsT. art. IX, § 2 (1848) provided:
The general assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation,
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to the value of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by
some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner
as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.
109. See Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417, cert. denied,
287 U.S. 641 (1932); Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602 (1876); Chicago
B. & Q.R.R. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591 (1874); Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak,
75 Ill. 292 (1874).
110. 68 Ill. 510 (1873).
111. Id. at 512.
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person or persons designated by the General Assembly, and not

otherwise.'

12

Such a bar to judicial review, however, is not found on the face
of the constitutional provision.' 8
The 1970 Illinois Constitution provided new language regarding the taxation of real property. Article IX, section 4 of the
1970 Constitution provides that "except as otherwise provided
in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly
by valuation as the General Assembly shall provide by law." In
LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook,'1 4 the taxpayers argued that the change in language reflected in the 1970 Constitution eliminated the restriction on judicial review of the action
of the Assessor. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contention stating:
The plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of constructive
fraud, which has restricted judicial review of real estate assessments, was eliminated by the 1970 Constitution. Plaintiffs argue
that, by the elimination of the language from the 1870 Constitution upon which the doctrine of constructive fraud was based,
the delegates intended to authorize the review of assessments in
an action in equity.
Section 1 of article IX of the Constitution of 1870 provided:
The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may
be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed
in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not
otherwise; * * * (Emphasis added.)
Section 4(a) of article IX of the Constitution of 1970 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Section taxes upon
real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law. (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs contend that by virtue of the difference in the
italicized language in the two sections set out above the constitutional convention has eliminated the restrictive language of the
1870 Constitution which prohibited judicial review of assess112. Id.
113. The limitation on judicial review is not readily apparent from a
reading of article IX, § 1 of the 1870 constitution, and the limitation appears to be solely a self-imposed limitation by the court. See, e.g., People ex rel. Thomas v. Nixon, 3'53 Ill. 556, 573, 187 N.E. 650, 656 (1933);
Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. People, 161 Ill. 132, 140, 43 N.E. 691,
694 (1896); Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510, 512 (1873). However, the court failed to lift the self-imposed ban when given the opportunity to interpret the 1970 constitution in LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County
of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974). See text accompanying
notes 114-17 infra.
114. 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974).
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ments other than on the basis of constructive fraud. We cannot
accept this argument.
Under section 4(a) of article IX of the 1970 Constitution it
is the General Assembly which has the authority to determine
how and by whom the valuation of the property shall be ascertained. The constitutional debates contain only slight reference
to the subject of judicial review of assessments. Delegate Karns,
who had submitted the proposed amendment, was asked if he
would be amenable to the insertion of some phrase or clause in
his amendment which would make judicial review more likely.
Delegate Karns indicated he would not. The discussion further
indicated that judicial review under the proposed amendment
would be limited to substantially the same areas that had previously been delineated by decisions of this court. (3 Proceedings
2023.) The difference in the language used in the 1970 Constitution, which is italicized above, has not altered the scope of judicial review of real estate tax assessments.' 15
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the change
in language between the 1870 Constitution and the 1970 Constitution did not alter the scope of judicial review of real estate
tax assessments,'" even though no constitutional base for judicial abstention had existed in the revenue article of the 1870
17
Constitution.'
In People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc.,118 the
Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It is clear that courts, because of the separation of powers,
in the absence of a showing of actual or constructive fraud, have
no power to review, with a view to altering, the valuation of
property which has been fixed for purposes of taxation by appropriate administrative officers.' 19
In fact, however, the court's reliance upon the separation of
powers is simply restating the erroneous base originally delineated by the court. That is, that judicial review of excessive
assessments is precluded because review would be exercising
the discretion which the constitution has lodged in administrative officers. Clearly, article II, section 1 of the 1970 Constitution 120 does not mean that the powers of government must
115. Id. at 328-30, 312 N.E.2d at 257-58 (emphasis in original).
116. "The difference in the language used in the 1970 Constitution
from that used in the 1870 Constitution . . . has not altered the scope
of judicial review of real estate tax assessments." Id. at 330, 312 N.E.2d
at 258.
117. See note 113 and accompanying text supra. Cf. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974).
118. 45 Ill. 2d 338, 259 N.E.2d 27 (1970).
119. Id. at 340, 259 N.E.2d at 29.
The court's statement is a clear non sequitur. That the assessor has
exclusive power to determine the value of property for real estate purposes does not prove that the court is without power to review the valuation which is allegedly excessive. Nothing in the Revenue Act withdraws the power of the court to review an assessor's action.
120. Article II, § 1 of the 1970 Constitution provides that, " It] he legis-
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be divided into rigidly separated compartments with judicial
review of actions of the other two branches to-tally precluded.
Rather, it means that "'the whole power of two or more of the
branches of government shall not be lodged in the same
hands.' "121 The court's reliance on the separation of powers
to support its refusal to review excessive assessments absent
fraud is misplaced. As was stated by Mr. Justice Powell in

United States v. Richardson:
We should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise
if a democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected
branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large
measure,

insulated,

judicial

branch ....

The

irreplaceable

value of the power articulated by Chief Justice Marshall [in
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)] lies in the protection
it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups
against oppressive or discrim122
inatory government action.
The courts do have the power to review administrative decisions, and real property assessments are without doubt administrative decisions. 123 The court's function in reviewing administrative decisions is to determine if the decisions are supported by
124
substantial evidence or the manifest weight of the evidence.
Assessments should not constitutionally receive any different
treatment.

125

Careful analysis reveals that review by the courts of alleged
excessive assessments is not in conflict with section 1 of article
II of the 1970 Constitution. A court in reviewing an assessment
simply determines whether the assessment was based upon substantial evidence or the manifest weight of the evidence, as it
does in reviewing any other administrative decision. 126 The
court thus ensures that the person to whom the General Assembly has delegated the authority to ascertain the valuation of
lative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." ILL. CONsT. art. II, § 1

(1970).

121. City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170, 174, 311
N.E.2d 146, 148 (1974); accord Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 Ill. 2d
109, 122-23, 355 N.E.2d 537, 542 (1976).
122. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
123. See, e.g., Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. Quinn Home Builders, 11 Ill. 2d 111, 142 N.E.2d 60 (1957), in which the court reviewed an
administrative decision not subject to review under the Administrative
Review Act.
124. Id.
125. See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.

126. The Administrative Review Act provides that the "findings and

conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be

held to be prima facie true and correct." When subject to the Administrative Review Act, courts apply the substantial evidence or manifest
weight of the evidence test. Davern v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 47 Ill. 2d
469, 269 N.E.2d 713 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971).
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real estate for tax purposes is not abusing the discretion vested
in him. In this manner the court performs the judicial function
of determining whether the factors upon which the assessment
is based are valid and substantial. Thus, the court's naked statements that judicial review of excessive assessments absent fraud
would violate the separation of powers is simply not true. If
it were, there would be no judicial review of any executive or
legislative acts since each instance of review would constitute
a violation of the separation of powers. Furthermore, the Illinois
Supreme Court, by refusing to lift its self-imposed limitation on
judicial review of excessive assessments, 127 has forced the taxpayer to look to the General Assembly as its sole source for re12 8
lief.
B.

Constructive Fraud-A Manipulative Concept

One of the bases for the doctrine of constructive fraud is
the court's refusal to ignore a truly gross overvaluation. When
confronted with its self-imposed bar to the review of excessive
assessments and with assessments clearly out of line with actual
value, the court has found the assessment to be constructively
fraudulent thereby opening the door to judicial relief. A closer
look at this basis, which served as a foundation for the origination of the doctrine of constructive fraud, reveals that the court's
stated reasons for application of the doctrine are merely a sham
to cover the inadequacies of a system in which there would be
no judicial review of assessments at all.
The Illinois Supreme Court in the earliest decisions refused
to review allegedly excessive assessments unless the taxpayer
-could prove actual fraud, that is, that the assessor had a dishonest motive in making the assessment. 12 In later cases,
the court was faced with grossly excessive assessments where
no dishonest motive was proved. 130 The court, rather than
127. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d
252 (1974).
128. See Part IV infra.
129. New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill. 383, 51 N.E. 629
(1898).
130. See Hoyne Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 60 Ill. 2d 84, 322 N.E.2d
833 (1974); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312
N.E.2d 252 (1974); Clarendon Assocs. v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d

299 (1973); White v. Board of Appeals, 45 Ill. 2d 378, 259 N.E.2d 51
(1970); People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights Corp., 45 Ill. 2d

338, 259 N.E.2d 27 (1970); People ex rel. Joseph v. Schoenborn, 41 Ill.
2d 302, 242 N.E.2d 147 (1968); People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc.,

36 Ill. 2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650 (1966); People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A.

Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966); People ex rel. County Collector
v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 33 Ill. 2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694
(1965); People ex ret. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543
(1964); People ex rel. Schmulbach v. City of St. Louis, 408 Ill. 491, 97
N.E.2d 252 (1951); People ex rel. Johnson v. Robison, 406 Ill. 280, 94
N.E.2d 151 (1950); People ex rel. Tennyson v. Texas Co., 406 Ill. 120,
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allow the assessment to stand, gave relief against the excessive
131
assessment.
The body of law with respect to judicial review of excessive
assessments is less than inspiring. The law is made up largely
of ad hoc decisions, often seemingly influenced by considerations
other than those which strictly relate to the individual taxpayer's
dilemma. Even the simple question of whether constructive
fraud is governed by rule or by discretion has no clear answer.
Perhaps the answer is that discretion plays the larger role, that
mixtures of rule and discretion are common, and that such rules
as exist are usually but not always unclear and commonly violated. This ad hoc approach has been adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court which seldom mentions explicitly its discretionary power to find or not find constructive fraud. However, the
three most common situations in which the court has granted
relief using as its basis the doctrine of constructive fraud are:
(1) where the assessment is so excessive it could not have been
honestly made; (2) Where the assessment has been made by mere
will without the exercise of judgment; -and (3) where the assessment is arbitrarily made in disregard of the recognized elements
of value.
92 N.E.2d 142 (1950); People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp., 388 Ill.
219, 57 N.E.2d 859 (19,44); People ex rel. McDonough v. Chicago Union
Lime Works Co., 361 Ill. 304, 198 N.E. 1 (1935); People ex rel. McDonough v. Schmuhl, 359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935); People ex rel. Wangelin v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 192 N.E. 664 (1934); People ex rel. Nash v.
Norton, 358 111. 272, 193 N.E. 129 (1934); People ex rel. McDonough v.
Grand Trunk W.R.R., 35.7 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934); People ex rel.
Wangelin v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 357 Ill. 245, 191 N.E. 300 (1934); People
ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296 (1934);
Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417 (1932); Kinderman v.
Harding, 345 Ill. 237, 178 N.E. 71 (1930); Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354,
172 N.E. 772 (1930); People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E.
600 (1924); People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 300 Ill. 399,
133 N.E. 325 (1921); People ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk & Hamilton
Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 467 (1919); People's Gas Light Co. v.
Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919); Calumet & Chicago Canal &
Dock Co. v. O'Connell, 265 Ill. 106, 106 N.E. 452 (1914); First Nat'l Bank
v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 893 (1910).
131. See People ex rel. County Collector v. American Refrigerator
Transit Co., 33 Ill. 2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694 (1965); Pedple ex rel. Rhodes
v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513 (1945); People ex rel. McGaughey
v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5 (1937); People ex rel. McDonough
v. Schmuhl, 3159 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935); People ex rel. Wangelin
v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 192 N.E. 664 (1934); People ex rel. McDonough
v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934); People ex rel.
Wangelin v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 3,57 Ill. 245, 191 N.E. 300 (1934); People
ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296 (1934);
Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930); People ex rel. Carr
v. Stewart, 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924); People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, B & Q.R.R., 300 Ill. 399, 133 N.E. 325 (1921); People ex rel. Little
v. St. Louis Elec. Bridge Co., 290 Ill. 307, 125 N.E. 280 (1919); People
ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122
N.E. 467 (1919).
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(1)

Review of Real Estate Assessments
Assessment So Excessive as to Connote Dishonest Valuation

In Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, one of the first cases in which
the Illinois Supreme Court granted relief from an excessive assessment not actually fraudulent, the court reasoned:
[S]ince the value of property is matter of opinion, upon which
different minds, with equal opportunities of knowledge, and actuated by the same honest desire to arrive at the truth, are liable widely to differ, it has always been held, in this court, that
a court of equity will never interfere to enjoin the collection of
a tax, merely because the property has been assessed at a greater
valuation than the court would have fixed upon it. Where, however, the valuation is so grossly out of the way as to show that
the assessor could not have been honest in his valuation-must
reasonably have known that it was excessive-it is accepted as
evidence of fraud upon his part against the taxpayer, and the
court will interpose.132
1 :
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the reasoning of this court.
For example, where the taxpayer's property was assessed at
60% of full value while other property in the state was assessed
at not more than 37% of its full value, the court found the disparity too great to have been mere error, and determined that
the assessor could not have been honest in his valuation. 1 34
Thus the court held the assessment invalid because the rate was
too high in comparison with the rate used for other like property. 13 5 Because the court had previously held that it had no
132. Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602, 609-10 (1876).
133. Accord, People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights Corp., 45
Ill. 2d 338, 259 N.E.2d 27 (1970); People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W.,
Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650 (1966); People ex rel. Nordlund v.
S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966); People ex rel. Rhodes
v. Turk. 391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513 (1945); People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied
Oil Corp., 388 Ill. 219, 57 N.E.2d 859 (1944); People ex rel. Hellyer v.
Hendrickson, 373 Ill. 99, 25 N.E.2d 507 (1940); People ex rel. McGaughey
v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5 (1937); People ex rel. McDonough
v. Schmuhl, 359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935); People ex rel. Wangelin
v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 192 N.E. 664 (1934); People ex rel. Nash v. Norton, 358 Ill. 272, 193 N.E. 129 (1934); People ex rel. Wangelin v. St. Louis
Bridge Co., 357 Ill. 245, 191 N.E. 300 (1934); People ex rel. Wangelin v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296 (1934); Aldrich v. Harding,
340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930); People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 Ill.
25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924); People ex rel. Little v. St. Louis Elec. Bridge
Co., 290 Ill. 307, 125 N.E. 280 (1919); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v.
Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919).
134. People ex rel. McDonough v. Illinois C.R.R., 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E.
82 (1934). Accord, People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago M. St. P. & P.R.R.,
381 Ill. 58, 44 N.E.2d 566 (1942); People ex rel. McDonough v. Schmuhl,
359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935); People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand
Trunk W.R.R., 357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934); People's Gas Light Co.
v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919); State Bd. of Equalization
v. People ex rel. Goggin, 191 Ill. 528, 61 N.E. 339 (1901); Pacific Hotel
Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602 (1876); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591
(1874).
135. People ex rel. McDonough v. Illinois C.R.R., 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E.
82 (1934).
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power to review or determine the value of property fixed for
purposes of taxation by the proper officers and that an assessment is not fraudulent merely because it is excessive, the court
was forced to find the excessive assessments to be evidence that
the assessor was acting with improper motives and on this basis
was able to grant relief to the burdened taxpayer."'3 "
(2)

Assessments Made Without the Exercise of Judgement

In People ex rel. Carrv. Stewart,13 7 the taxpayers' real estate
in Cook County was valued for tax purposes at 150% of actual
value while all other property was assessed at 60% of its actual
value. The court stated:
Even if this overvaluation, great as it is, might not alone be evidence of fraud sufficient to impeach the assessment, the other
circumstances appearing in evidence, that the board refused to
consider sales of property in determining the value, and stated
that it did not consider them material in the case, is evidence
of an intention to fix the value arbitrarily, Without the exercise
that ought to have been taken
of judgment as to circumstances
3
into consideration.' 8
The reason given for sustaining the objections was not that the
property assessment was grossly excessive but that the overvaluation was grossly excessive when viewed in light of the taxpayer's supporting evidence. As was stated by the court: "taken
in connection with the other circumstances in the case, requires
the conclusion that it did not arise from error in the exercise of
honest judgment but was arbitrarily and intentionally made.' 1 39
136. For example, in People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill.

2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650 (1966), the court observed:
The law requires assessment of property at its fair market value.
The ascertainment of such value for purposes of taxation is primarily
for the administrative officers to whom this function is delegated,
and except for cases of fraud, courts will not undertake to review
the determination. When valuation has been fraudulently made it
is subject to judicial review, but more is required for this purpose
than merely showing an overvaluation. It is only where the property has been grossly overvalued, the assessed valuation being
reached under circumstances showing either lack of knowledge of
known values or a deliberate fixing of values contrary to the known
value, that fraud in law will be inferred. Before the conduct of the
taxing authorities will be considered constructive fraud, the evidence

must clearly establish that the assessment was made in ignorance
of the value of the property, or on a judgment not based upon readily ascertainablefacts,.or on a designedly excessive basis.

137. 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924).
138. Id. at 30, 145 N.E. at 602. (The property was assessed at $2,250
and $1,871, indicating a full value of $3,750 and $3,100, respectively).

139. Id. Accord, First Nat'l Bank v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 893

(1910); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People ex rel. Bertschi, 161
Ill. 514, 44 N.E. 206 (1896).
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Assessments Arbitrarily Made

The court granted relief from an excessive assessment in
People ex rel. McGaughey v. Wilson'4 0 where it was shown that
the excessive assessment was arbitrarily made in disregard of the
well recognized elements entering into the valuation of property.
The court stated:
Where the evidence clearly establishes that a gross over-valuation of property has been made under circumstances showing
that the actual value of the property was not considered, and
that the recognized standards by which the value of the property
is determined were not taken into consideration or applied in
fixing the valuation of the property, the valuation for assessment
so fixed is subject to review by the courts.14
It can clearly be discerned from a close evaluation of the
case law that the court when reviewing allegedly excessive assessments finds any excuse it can to right an obvious wrong.
Thus, there is no real "base" for the court's review other than
its determination that each particular assessment is unjust-the
result being a classification of reviewable assessments not governed by rule but by discretion. Even a cursory analysis of the
cases reveals the great harm to the Cook County taxpayer
resulting from the fact that he cannot objectively know under
what circumstances his overassessment will be reviewd. This
subjective approach adopted by the court warrants change.
C.

Judicial Relief: Determination Without a Mathematical Formula

In People ex rel. Nash v. Norton,142 the court stated: "In
the present case appellant has not shown by clear and convincing
proof that the assessment was so grossly excessive as to shock
the conscience or to be evidence of fraud or that it was made
with some corrupt, dishonest or illegal motive.'

1 43

The court

thus hinted that there might be excessive assessments which
would "shock the conscience" and for which the court would
grant relief. However, the court stated in People ex rel. McDonough v. Chicago Union Lime Works Co.' 4 1 that relief for
excessive assessments will only be granted when the excess
valuation is "so grossly excessive as to create a constructive
fraud."145

Currently there exists no mathematical guideline to distinguish between when an excessive assessment is not fraudulent
140. 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5 (1937).
141. Id. at 496, 12 N.E.2d at 6.
142. 358 Ill. 272, 193 N.E. 129 (1934).
143. Id. at 275, 193 N.E. at 130.
144. 361 Ill. 304, 198 N.E. 1 (1935).
145. Id. at 308, 198 N.E. at 3.
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and when it is so grossly excessive as to amount to a fraudulent
assessment. Thus the burdened taxpayer has no benchmark to
use in judging when the overassessment of his property for real
estate tax purposes is "constructively fraudulent.' 1

46

It is noteworthy, however, that the court has rejected taxpayer contentions that overvaluations were so excessive as to result
in a finding of a per se fraudulent assessment. As was stated by
the court in People ex rel. Harding v. Atwater: "Constructive
fraud is shown where the-overvaluation is grossly excessive, and
it is proved that the assessment was made either in ignorance of
the value of the property or that it was not based upon readily
obtainable facts.' 1 47 It is apparent that the court is unwilling to
bind itself to a rule solely based upon grossly excessive valuation. 148 It will only consider proof that the assessment is so
grossly excessive as to amount to fraud. Whether the taxpayer
has established that the assessed value upon his real estate is so
excessive as to amount in law to a fraud upon the part of the taxing authorities becomes a question of fact. In deciding this factual
question, the circumstances surrounding the overvaluation will
be considered. Because the court determines the constructive
fraud question in this manner, the taxpayer is at a loss to know
what constitutes a valuation so gross as to amount to a constructive fraud.
The unpredictability of what the court will do with an overvaluation question may be emphasized by contrasting People ex
rel. Johnson v. Robison 49 with People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart.'"
The fundamental attitudes of these two courts toward overvaluation seem to be at opposite ends of the spectrum. The taxpayer
in Stewart was allowed to recover on overassessments of 134.4%
and 138.4%;1"1 however, the taxpayer in Robison did not recover
146. For an in depth survey of the cases in which an excessive valuation percentage was alleged but constructive fraud was not found see Appendix A-I, p. 85 infra. For a survey of those cases in which constructive
fraud was found see Appendix A-II, p. 87 infra.
147. 362 Ill. 546, 552, 1 N.E.2d 46, 49-50 (1936) (emphasis added).
148. Id. Accord, People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp., 388 Ill.
219, 57 N.E.2d 859 (1944) (personal property).
149. 406 Ill. 280, 94 N.E.2d 151 (1950).
150. 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924).
151. The figures used by the court in considering the allegations of
overvaluation on two blocks of taxpayer's property were as follows:

North Block
$3,750 per front foot-Assessed Valuation
1,600 per front foot-Fair Cash Value
$2,150 difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $2,150

$1,600

-

134.4%
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on an overassessment of between 229.
and 370.7%.152 These
two contrasting cases are representative of the current state of
the law as to when an excessive valuation is constructively
fraudulent. 1 5
Clearly, this area is as devoid of objective legal
principles as any subject on which judicial opinions have been
written.
Where property in a private voluntary sale brought $25,000
and that same property was assessed for tax purposes at $82,500,
over three times the fair market value, the court granted relief
to the aggrieved taxpayer by inferring fraud in law and held
South Block
$3,100
1,300
$1800
Excessive

per front foot-Assessed Valuation
per front foot-Fair Cash Value
difference
Valuation Percentage: $1,800 = 138.4%
$1,300
152. The figures used by the court in Robison were as follows:
$ 273 per front foot - Assessed Valuation
58-83 per front foot - Fair Cash Value
$190-215 difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage 215 = 370.7%
58

Excessive Valuation Percentage

190 = 229.0%

83
153. See note 146 supra. There are few guidelines as to how excessive a valuation of real estate must be before a court will declare
it discriminatory and, therefore, constructively fraudulent. A 25% difference between the county assessor's assessment and the taxpayer's appraisal was held not to be constructively fraudulent but rather a mere
"difference of opinion" in valuation. People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A.
Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966). A valuation of twice the fair
market value was held not so excessive as to be fraudulent per se. People ex rel. Harding v. Atwater, 362 Ill. 546, 1 N.E.2d 46 (1936). However,
in People ex rel. County Collector v. American Refrigerator Transit Co.,
33 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05, 211 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1965), the court held as a matter of law that an overassessment of 78% or more constituted constructive
fraud.
It is clear that fraud, either actual or constructive, must be proved
in order to sustain the judgment. However, we do not think it necessary that there be an express finding of fraud if the evidence supports such a conclusion. Here, the evidence clearly shows that appellee's property, after application of the multiplier, was assessed at
$158,500 and that its actual fair market value was $161,000. Thus,
appellee's property was assessed at approximately 98% of its full
fair market value, while other locally assessed property was assessed
at only 55% of full fair market value. This, in our opinion, was
tantamount to constructive fraud....
The court's formula in determining the percentage of overassessment was
as follows: 98%-55% = 43% (valuation percentage in excess of other
locally assessed property); 43%-55% = 78.2% (percentage of excess assessment). See also People ex rel. Dallas v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 26 Ill. 2d
292-94, 186 N.E.2d 335, 335-36 (1962), where the court indicated that an
overassessment of 81.8% would constitute constructively fraudulent discrimination. See Gale, Assessment and Collection of Taxes, 1952 U. ILL.
L.F. 102, 196; Wattling, Real Property Taxation in Cook County Under
the Constitution of 1970, 6 J. MAR. J. 87, 91, n.13 (1972); Comment, The
Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxation, 33 ILL. L.
REv. 57, 67, n.60 (1938). See also Hoyne Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 60
Ill. 2d 84, 322 N.E.2d 833 (1974).
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that the taxpayer had shown excessive assessed value upon which
he was entitled to relief.15 4 However, where property was assessed at $20,998 for tax purposes and the taxpayer introduced
evidence that its fair market value was only $7,100, the court
refused to grant relief because the taxpayer's property had a
lower assessment than surrounding properties. 155
Another example discloses that where the disparity in value
for the taxpayer's two tracts of land was 5% and 25%, respectively, the court found that this disparity amounted to a mere
difference of opinion as to value. 15
The court stated:
The taxpayer urges this court to define the concept of constructive fraud on the basis of a grossly excessive assessment.
Unfortunately this concept, as other legal concepts, is not susceptible to precise definition. Our system of jurisprudence requires
that these inexact criteria be dealt with on a case-to-case
basis. 157
154. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513 (1945).
$82,500 Assessed Valuation
25,000 Fair Cash Value
$57,000 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $57,500
230.0%

$25,000
155. People ex rel. Nash v. Norton, 358 Ill. 272, 193 N.E. 129 (1934).
$20,998 Assessed Valuation
7,100 Fair Cash Value
$13,898 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $13,898 = 194.3%
'$ 7,100
156. People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d
233 (1966).
TRACT I
$183,700 Assessed Valuation
173,500 Fair Cash Value (taxpayer)
$ 10,200 Difference
5.9%
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $ 10,200 =
$173,500
$183,700 Assessed Valuation
177,000 Fair Cash Value (trial court)
$ : 6,700 Difference
3.8%
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $ 6,700 =
$177,000
TRACT II
$ 57,500 Assessed Valuation
43,000 Fair Cash Value (taxpayer)
$ 14,500 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $ 14,500 = 34.0%
$ 43,000
$ 57,500 Assessed Valuation
47,800 Fair Cash Value (trial court)
$ 9,700 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $ 9,700 = 20.3%
$ 47,800
157. People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 378, 215 N.E.
2d 233, 236 (1966).
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Similarly, in People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc.,15 8 the
court opined:
The record in the case at bar shows at most that these properties were merely assessed somewhat higher than they should
have been. There is nothing to indicate that the assessor was
not actuated by good faith, or that the assessments were not made
in the exercise of an honest, if erroneous, judgment. The objectors have not satisfied their burden of showing that the assessments were so grossly excessive as to amount to constructive
fraud . . . .159

The court in People ex rel. Schmulbach v. City of St.
Louis,1 60 in addressing the taxpayer's sole contention that the
assessed valuation was so excessive as to constitute constructive
fraud, stated that "the mere fact of overvaluation will not of itself
establish fraud. ' ' ""l It went on to review the facts and concluded
with the statement "that the evidence in this case is sufficient
to warrant the conclusion that the final assessment of the city's
property for taxation purposes is so grossly excessive that it con162
stitutes constructive fraud.'
Thus under certain circumstances known only to the court
overvaluation may be so excessive as to justify the conclusion

158. 36 Ill. 2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650 (1966).
159. Id. at 211-12, 221 N.E.2d at 652-53.
HOTEL - 1961

$ 36,150 Assessed Valuation
17,200 Fair Cash Value
$ 18,950 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $18,950
$17,200
HOTEL - 1962
$ 38,662 Assessed Valuation
17,200 Fair Cash Value
$ 21,462 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $21,462
$17,200
FARM
$128,440 Assessed Valuation
86,000 Fair Cash Value

110.2%

=

124.8%

$ 42,440 Difference

Excessive Valuation Percentage: $42,440
$86,000
160. 408 Ill. 491, 97 N.E.2d 252 (1951).
161. Id. at 499-500, 97 N.E.2d at 256.
162. Id. at 503, 97 N.E.2d at 257.
$6,439,935 Assessed Valuation
4,830,000 Fair Cash Value
$1,609,935 Difference
Excessive Valuation Percentage: $1,609,935
$4,830,000

=

49.3%

33.0%
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that it was not honestly made and is therefore constructively
fraudulent. A close review of the cases fails to reveal any objective criteria by which to measure the requisite "circumstances,"
or the amount by which property must be overassessed to be
considered "disproportionately" higher than other similar property. 1613 The affected taxpayer, therefore, can only guess
whether the court will review either a 5% overassessment or a
500% overassessment-clearly an unconscionable, additional burden to place on an already overburdened taxpayer.
ii.

Practical Stated and Unstated Reasons Underlying the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud

As can be readily discerned from the preceding material, the
authors find that none of the bases for judicial abstention from
reviewing assessments of real estate for tax purposes as stated
by the Illinois Supreme Court dictate its existence. Thus, the
true reasons behind the doctrine of constructive fraud must be
inferred from the implications bearing upon the wisdom of employing the doctrine.
A.

Judicial Review-An Impediment to the Collection and
Distribution of Revenue?

The court, in Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Pollak,164 stated:
[I]f every tax payer might appeal to the courts, either before

or after the warrant comes to the hands of the collector, the
greater portion of the revenue could be tied up and delayed for

years, and the very existence of the government endangered, as
its life depends upon the requisite amount of revenue for its support. 16

While this quotation addresses the primary objection to a judicial review of assessments, the rationale of this court is no longer
viable today. In Clarendon Associates v. Korzen,1 66 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer protesting his real estate
tax assessment must pursue his statutory remedy. 1 67 That
remedy requires the payment of the tax in full as a prerequisite
to contesting the assessment. Collection and distribution of taxes
therefore are no longer impaired by judicial review, and this
reason no longer supports judicial abstention from reviewing alleged overvaluations of real estate for tax purposes.
163.
Co., 33
164.
165.
166.

People ex rel. County Collector v. American Refrigerator Transit
Ill. 2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694 (1965).
75 Ill. 292 (1874).
Id. at 296.
56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1974).
167. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 675, 716 (1975).
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Sales Data Records: Objective Evidence for Judicial Review

The doctrine of constructive fraud was expounded in Illinois
in 1874.168 At that time there were neither machine records systems nor sophisticated data storage capabilities. Knowledge of
the sale of real estate could be difficult, if not impossible to obtain. This lack of basic sales data could have been an unexpressed reason for the courts allowing the determination of the
assessing official to stand except under very extenuating circumstances for the taxpayer.
Approximately 100 years later, the technology of records
keeping has changed drastically along with certain statutory provisions. Cook County has a sophisticated machine records system1' 6 9 which is used by the Assessor in conducting sales studies.
Indeed such studies should routinely be subpoenaed by taxpayers
filing excessive valuation objections to the Collector's Application
for Judgment.
Allied with machine records technology are statutory aids.
Each parcel of real estate in Cook County has a permanent real
estate tax number. 17 0 This number is used primarily for the billing of real estate taxes; however, its use in tracing the sale of
real estate is invaluable. Additionally, in 1970 the General
Assembly revolutionalized the gathering of real estate sales information 1 7 1 through the passage of the Real Estate Transfer Tax
Act. This act calls for a tax to be imposed of $.50 per $500
of consideration for real estate transferred. Of more importance to assessment practices, however, is the requirement
of a declaration to be executed which not only reflects payment of the tax but also contains other information:
At the time a deed is presented for recordation there shall
also be presented to the Recorder of Deeds or Registrar of Titles,
a declaration signed by at least one of the sellers and also signed
by at least one of the buyers in the transaction or by the attorneys or agents for the sellers or buyers, which declaration shall
state the full consideration for the property so transferred, the
permanent real estate index number of the property, if any; the
legal description of the property; the date of the deed; the type
of deed; the address of the property; the type of improvement,
if any, on the property conveyed; information as to whether the
transfer is between relatives or is a compulsory transaction; and
the lot size or acreage. . . . The declaration form shall be prescribed by the Department of Local Government Affairs and
shall include an appropriate place for the inclusion of special
facts or circumstances, if any. . . . The Recorder of Deeds or
Registrar of Titles shall not record such declaration, but shall
168.
169.
170.
171.

Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 75 Ill. 292 (1874).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 1104.6 (1975).
Id. ch. 120, § 511.
Id. ch. 34, § 1002.
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insert thereon the Document Number assigned to the deed, and
shall then transmit such declaration to the Supervisor of Assessments, assessor or Board of Assessors of the county, as the case
may be, who shall insert on such declaration the most recent assessed value for each parcel of the transferred property, and, at
least once during every month, shall transmit all such declarations to the Department of Local Government Affairs. The
supervisor of assessments, assessor or board of assessors of the
county may also copy and retain any information relating to the
property transferred to assist his office in determining the
proper assessed valuation of the property tiansferred and other
17 2
propertiesin his county.
1 73
These declarations are public records available for inspection.
In addition, as public records they are admissible into evidence
at any trial. 174 Finally, it should be pointed out that it is a crimi175
nal offense to falsify the consideration on such a declaration.
The end result of a machine records system, a permanent
real estate tax number system and the mandatory filing of declarations in connection with the sale of real estate is to give
both the public1 76 and the Assessor the best possible evidence
as to sales of real estate. Although this information alone will
not assure exact assessments, it goes a long way to furnish objective facts to back up the judgments of both the taxpayer and
the Assessor as to what the proper value should be. Since assess77
ments in Cook County are now a percentage of market value,
sales of the property itself or comparable properties should be
of great weight in determining the assessed value of real estate.
The means now available negate the underlying problem of objective fact accumulation which was present in 1874 or as late
as 1970. To the extent the problem is gone, the basis for the
doctrine of constructive fraud no longer exists.
C.

Judicial Review: An Examination of Its Effect upon the
Volume of Litigation and the Uniformity of Taxation

One of the court's unstated reasons for avoiding review of
assessments was quite possibly the fact that it felt that the judi172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. § 1003 (emphasis added).
Id. § 1005.
Id. ch. l10A, § 216(d).
Id. ch. 34, § 1005.
People v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 181 N.E.2d 376 (1962); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103 (197'5).
See also People ex rel. Hamer v.
Board of Educ., 130 Ill. App. 2d 592, 264 N.E.2d 420 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 120, § 579.1 (1975); Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 482, 322
N.E.2d 20, 24 (1975).
177. See notes 9 & 10 supra. Market value is defined as "that value,
estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale." Cook
County, Ill., Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, § 1 (b)
(2) (originally enacted Dec. 17, 1973, amended Nov. 29, 1976, June 6,
1977).
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ciary would be overly burdened by cases alleging excessive assessments for real estate tax purposes and that if it were to
undertake this added burden, uniformity of taxation would be
lost.1 7 8 It appears clear to the authors, however, that even if
the aforementioned reasons for judicial abstention from review
of alleged overvaluations for real estate tax purposes were at
one time valid, they are no longer valid today.
It is especially apparent from the decisions of the depression
7
years that the court had wearied of the ever-present tax cases.1'
That amount of litigation, however, must be contrasted with the
number of excessive assessment cases before the courts in the
downstate counties in which there is judicial review under the
1 80
It
Administrative Review Act. There have been very few.
is the authors' belief that the reason for this disinclination on
the part of the downstate taxpayer to resort to the courts is because most questions of valuation are equitably resolved in the
appeal proceedings before the Property Tax Appeal Board.' 8 '
Perhaps the reason for this equitable resolution at the board
stage is due to the fact that judicial review of the decisions of
the Property Tax Appeal Board is available under the Administrative Review Act, albeit infrequently used, and thus provides
added impetus for the Property Tax Appeal Board to be very
scrupulous in its treatment of taxpayer complaints. 1 82 It has
178. The cardinal principle of uniformity of taxation is found in the
constitution which provides that "taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly." ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1970). People ex rel. Bracker
v. Orvis, 301 Ill. 350, 133 N.E. 787 (1922).
This rule of uniformity requires that one person shall not be compelled to pay a greater proportion of the taxes, according to the

value of his property, than another ....

Uniformity in taxing im-

plies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality cannot ex-

ist without uniformity in the basis of assessment, as well as in the
rate of taxation.

Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 629, 181 N.E. 417, 419, cert. denied, 287
U.S. 641 (1932).
179. In People ex rel. Nash v. Norton, 358 Ill. 272, 275, 193 N.E. 129,
130 (1934), the court took judicial notice of the fact that the legal ma-

chinery set up to hear assessment complaints had been "swamped with

thousands of like petitions from distressed property owners during the
past few years." See also, People ex rel. Sweitzer v. Orrington Co., 360
Ill. 289, 195 N.E. 642 (1935).
180. See note 277 and accompanying text infra.
181. See notes 276-77 and accompanying text infra.

182. In 1967, the Illinois General Assembly provided:
The [Property Tax Appeal] Board shall make a decision in each appeal or case heard by it, and such decision shall be based upon equity and the weight of the evidence and not upon constructive fraud,
and shall be binding upon appellant and officials of government.
Final administrative decisions of the Property Tax Appeal Board

are subject to review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975). Thus for the other 101 counties in

Illinois, the doctrine of constructive fraud no longer exists if the taxpayer
selects the Property Tax Appeal Board route for objecting to his exces-
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therefore been proven in practicb that the availability of review
will not open the floodgates of litigation and will not substantially increase the work load of the judiciary.
Furthermore, judicial review will not adversely affect the
83
uniformity of taxation. As was stated in the previous section,'
the mechanization of the real estate sales records provides clear
objective evidence upon which assessments may be based. In addition, section 501 of the Revenue Act'8 4 specifically enumerates
how real property shall be valued for purposes of taxation.
Cook County property is assessed at a percentage of its fair market value.'185 In valuing property, the Assessor may compare the
same characteristics in order to formulate a correct assessment.'8 6
Because objective evidence is now available upon which this decision may be based, there is no longer a valid reason for barring judicial inquiry in the valuation of property for real estate
tax purposes. It therefore appears that opening Cook County
assessments for real estate tax purposes to direct judicial review
would neither over-burden the judiciary nor upset uniformity
of taxation.
D.

Cook County: A De Jure Classification System

Perhaps one of the .most overwhelming reasons behind the
court's refusal to directly review Cook County assessments for
real estate tax purposes was the judiciary's unstated desire to
not upset the de facto classification system of Cook County. 8's
The viability of the Cook County system of de facto classification
depended upon the inability of a taxpayer, who by virtue of the
system was subject to an above average assessment, to obtain
judicial relief from the overvaluation of his property. 8 8 The
sive assessed valuation. The doctrine mandatorily exists in Illinois only
for Cook County real estate taxpayers. For Cook County, decisions of
the Board of Appeals are not directly appealable under the Administrative Review Act. Id. ch. 110, § 264. Section 265 of the Administrative
Review Act provides that the Act shall apply "where the Act creating
or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the
provisions of this Act." Id. § 265. The provisions of the Administrative
Review Act are not expressly adopted in the statute creating or conferring power on the Board of Appeals.
183. See text accompanying notes 168-77 supra.
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (1975).
185. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (1975).
187. Classification of real property for purposes of taxation is a system
wherein real estate is grouped into classes which are then taxed at varying rates. See generally Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in Cook
County-The "Railroad Cases" and the Future of De Facto Classification,
1 J. MAR. J. 212 (1968). See also Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172
N.E. 772 (1930).
188. The doctrine of constructive fraud operates to protect the Assessor and Board of Appeals from judicial review except under narrowly

circumscribed conditions, and thus also protected Cook County's system
of de facto classification.
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classification of property in Cook County was, prior to 1970, de
facto, as no constitutional or statutory provision sanctioned the
classification system."' The system did, however, serve to maximize tax revenues. 190 Thus it is not surprising for the judiciary
to avoid litigation in which the validity of the classification system would be directly contested.
This is not the case today. With the advent of the 1970
Constitution, the de facto classification system became de jure.
Article IX, subsection 4 (b) of the 1970 Constitution provides for
independent classification by Cook County as well as some five
other counties with populations of more than 200,000.191 Therefore, if the unexpressed reason for past judicial abstention from
the review of Cook County tax assessments was the fear of upsetting the de facto system of classification, it can only be stated
that this reason no longer exists.
iii.

Judicial Review:
Taxpayer

A Persuasive Case for the Cook County

Returning to the Cook County taxpayer whose property was
overvalued for real estate tax purposes, assume for the moment
that he is in court. 192 At trial he is faced with the burden of
proving fraud-either actual or constructive. Assuming that
there has been no actual fraud in the assessment, what must the
taxpayer demonstrate in order to prove that the assessment was
constructively fraudulent? As discussed previously, there are no
benchmarks by which the taxpayer can measure whether his excessive assessment is reviewable, albeit indirectly. He is faced
189. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1870), provided that "the general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by
valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property." Section 1 authorized only
a general, unclassified property tax. The Revenue Act provides that real
property shall be valued at its fair cash value. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 501 (1975). Thus, classification of real property for purposes of taxation was precluded, and any classification for those purposes existing in
Cook County was de facto.
190. The percentages of actual value used in the assessment of real
property vary from class to class and the result is a maximization of
tax revenues.
191. Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of more than
200,000 may classify or to [sic] continue to classify real property for
purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable and
assessments shall be uniform within each class. The level of assessment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall not exceed
two and one-half times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the
lowest class in that county. Real property used in farming in a
county shall not be assessed at a higher level of assessment than
single family residential real property in that county.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b) (1970).
See People ex rel. Kutner v. Cullerton, 58 Ill. 2d 266, 319 N.E.2d 55 (1974).
192. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
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with a doctrine governed by no rules, regulations or mathematical formula. His attorney will be unable to advise him regarding the possibility of having his excessive assessment reviewed
by the court. 1 3 Clearly, in no other area is a public official
granted such broad discretion. Overvaluations of from 3.8%
to 1584% have gone unreviewed. Such discretion is not the case
94
for valuations for any other tax purposes.
The authors have failed to find any substance to the judiciary's stated bases for its refusal to review alleged overvaluations.
Similarly, any reasons for refusing review which could possibly
be inferred from the decisions have been found to be groundless.
It is the authors' conclusion therefrom that judicial review of
real estate tax assessments should not be barred for any reason
and should be available so that the Cook County real estate taxpayer, such as the hypothetical taxpayer discussed above, need
not flail in waters muddied by a dearth of rules and unfettered
administrative discretion.
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REAL ESTATE ASSESSMENTS
IN COUNTIES OTHER THAN COOK

1. Level of Assessment
Although a number of counties have populations in excess
of 200,000 and, therefore, are allowed under the 1970 Illinois Constitution' ' to classify real estate for purposes of taxation, only
Cook County has adopted a classification system. In the other
101 counties, assessments are subject to statutory review procedures that are not available in Cook County.
After receiving a decision from the local Board of Review,
the downstate taxpayer has two alternative courses to choose
from in seeking review of his assessment. Without paying the
taxes in question under protest, he may appeal to the Property
Tax Appeal Board; " 7 however, unpaid taxes can be sold at a tax
sale.'9 *8 Alternatively, he may pay the taxes under protest and
193. See text accompanying notes 132-62 supra.
See note 286 infra.
195. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b) (1970).
196. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (1975). Hamer v. Kirk, 65 Ill. 2d
211, 357 N.E.2d 506 (1976).
197. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.1 (1975).
198. There is no delay on the extension of taxes on any assessment
appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §
592.4 (1975). The county clerk extends the taxes on the collectors books
based on the assessment pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 639-654
(1975), and issues a collector's warrant, id. § 651, commanding the collector to collect the taxes. Delinquent taxes are subject to sale pursuant
194.

to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 706.
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file objections to the Collector's Application for Judgment as is
required of a Cook County taxpayer. From the downstate taxpayer's viewpoint, the far more favorable choice is to appeal to
the Property Tax Appeal Board.
2.
(a)

Appeals to the Property Tax Appeal Board

Taxpayers

Established in 1967,11111 the Property Tax Appeal Board
consists of three members appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 20 0 To commence an appeal
to the Property Tax Appeal Board, the taxpayer must file a petition with its clerk within thirty days after the date of the written notice of the Board of Review's decision. A copy of the taxpayer's petition must be mailed by the clerk of the Property Tax
Appeal Board to the Board of Review whose decision is being appealed. 20 1 This petition must set forth specifically the facts upon
which the taxpayer bases his objection to the decision of the
Board of Review, together with a statement of the contentions of
20 2
law which he desires to raise, and the relief he requests.
In order to be able to present a petition for review to the
Property Tax Appeal Board, the taxpayer must have had a decision from his local Board of Review from which he is complaining.2 0 3 Thus in the absence of the taxpayer or taxing bodies
filing complaints or any -action by the Board of Review initiated
by it concerning his assessment, it is doubtful that a taxpayer
could appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board. A dismissal
of a complaint by a Board of Review for want of prosecution
would also seem to preclude review by the Property Tax Appeal
Board. Furthermore, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 20 4 could arguably be applicable and require the tax199. Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill.

2d 513, 514, 272 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.1 (1975).
200. Id. § 592.1.
201. Id. § 592.2.
202. Id. § 592.1.
provides:

Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 3 in pertinent part

PETITIONS-APPLICATION
A. Petitions for appeal must be filed within 30 days after receipt of written notice of the decision of the Board of Review. Petitions sent by mail shall be considered as filed on the date postmarked. ...

E. Every petition for appeal shall state the facts upon which the
appellant bases his objection to the decision of the Board of Review,
together with a statement of the contentions of law which he desires
to raise and the relief he requests.
Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board, Rule 3 (Nov. 15, 1975)
thereinafter Appeal Board Rules].

203. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 590.1, 592.1 (1975).
204. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to
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payer's participation in hearings before the Board of Review as
a prerequisite to filing a proper appeal to the Property Tax
Appeal Board. In this light, let us consider three separate factual
situations in which the Board of Review could make a decision
and a taxing body does not appeal that decision to the Property
Tax Appeal Board.
In the first situation, the taxpayer files a complaint before
the Board of Review alleging his property is incorrectly assessed.205 His participation in the hearing would be considered
an exhaustion of his administrative remedies.20 6 Thereafter, the
Board of Review must give the taxpayer written notice of its
decision.2117 The notice is most helpful to laymen in that it must
contain the following: "You may appeal this decision to the
Property Tax Appeal Board by filing a petition for review with
the Property Tax Appeal Board within thirty days after this
notice is mailed to you or your agent, or is personally served upon
you or your agent."
In the second situation, the Board of Review increases all
assessments of a class of real estate. 2°8 The taxpayer must be
given notice, but let us assume that he does not appear at the
hearing and that he later appeals the "decision" to the Property
Tax Appeal Board within the proper time period. Under these
circumstances, two interesting issues arise. Would the taxpayer
receive notice of the Board of Review's decision? The statute
209
provides:
If a final decision of a Board of Review may be the subject
of an appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board, as provided in
Sections 111.1 through 111.5 of this Act, written notice of its decision shall be given by the board of review to the taxpayer
affected ...
The taxpayer is affected by the Board of Review's decision. If
he does receive a notice, is this an approval to pursue a proper
appeal? Moreover, the statute governing appeals to the Property
Tax Appeal Board speaks in general terms. It states:210
[A]ny taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a board of review as such decision pertains to the assessment of his property
for taxation purposes, . . . may, within 30 days after the date
of written notice of the decision of the board of review, appeal
such decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review. ...
all Cook County taxpayers and requires them to file a complaint, have
a hearing and receive a decision from the Board of Appeals.
205. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 589(4) (1975).
206. In re County Collector, 11 Ill. App. 3d 290, 296 N.E.2d 361 (1973);
People ex rel. Needham v. Abbott Estate, 47 Ill. 2d 491, 497, 265 N.E.2d
612, 616 (1970); Shappert Eng'r Co. v. Weitemeyer, 34 Ill. 2d 97, 213
N.E.2d 530 (1966).
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 590.1 (1975).
208. Id. § 589(5).
209. Id. § 590.1 (footnote omitted).
210. Id. § 592.1 (emphasis added).
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The rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board also use the same
terminology and do not require any appearance of the taxpayer
2
before the Board of Review as a prerequisite to an appeal. ''
In the third situation, a taxing body initiates and files a
complaint before the Board of Review. ' 1 2 Notice is given to the
taxpayer, but he does not appear at the hearing. Once again,
we have the problems of notice and the proper construction of
the statute and Property Tax Appeal Board Rules. It is the authors' opinion that a taxpayer need not appear before the Board
of Review in either the second or the third situation. However,
prudent advice by a taxpayer's attorney would require appearances before the Board of Review until a court decision clarifies
the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
A taxpayer could become involved in an appeal from a Board
of Review's decision in yet another situation. Assume that the
taxpayer, after looking on and without participating in the hearing, is satisfied with the Board of Review's decision in factual
situations two or three. However, affected taxing bodies are not
213
satisfied, and they appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board.
Rule 6 of the Property Tax Board allows intervention by the
taxpayer..2 14 The rule does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Board of Review.
(b)

Taxing Bodies

For every taxpayer, there are taxing bodies interested or
potentially interested in the amount of his assessment. There
211. Property Tax Appeal Board Rules 6 and 7 provide:
Rule No. 6

INTERESTED PARTIES-INTERVENTION
A. Any taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a Board of Review as such decision pertains to the assessment of his property for
taxation purposes or any taxing body that has an interest in the decision of the Board of Review on an assessment made by any local
assessment officer, may become a party to the appeal.
Rule No. 7
REPRESENTATION AT HEARINGS
A. For purposes of this rule only a taxpayer dissatisfied with
the decision of a Board of Review as such decision pertains to the
assessment of his property for taxation purposes, or a taxing body
that has a tax revenue interest in the decision of the Board of Review
on an assessment made by any local assessment officer, may file an
appeal.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rules 6 & 7 (emphasis added).
212. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 589.2 (1975).
213. Id. § 592.1.
214. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 6 in pertinent part provides:
C. An appeal commenced by an interested taxing body shall
comply with paragraph (J) of Rule No. 3. The taxpayer/owner of
the property shall be notified by the Property Tax Appeal Board of
the appeal so that the taxpayer may have an opportunity to intervene in the proceedings. Should the taxpayer desire to intervene,
he shall file a Request to Intervene within 30 days after being notified by the Property Tax Appeal Board of the appeal.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 6.
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are three factual situations in which a taxing body could become
involved in an appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board concerning a taxpayer's assessment.
In the first situation the taxing body initiates and files a
complaint with the Board of Review concerning the assessment
of a particular taxpayer's property. A taxing body can commence such a review by filing a written complaint with the Board
of Review within twenty calendar days after the assessment
books are delivered to it. The Board of Review cannot increase
the amount of an assessment without first giving due notice and
an opportunity to be heard to the taxpayer affected. 21 5 Notice of

the Board of Review's decision is given to a taxing body in the
same form as is given to a taxpayer. 21

A taxing body must

Board within the same
then appeal to the Property Tax Appeal
217
thirty days as is given to a taxpayer.

In the second situation a taxpayer files a complaint with the
Board of Review, the taxing body does not appear and the board
renders a decision favorable to the taxpayer. 2 1

This assumes

that the Board of Assessors, Assessor or Supervisor of Assessments, as the case may be, who received a copy of the taxpayer's
complaint, does not sufficiently protect the taxing body's interests. 219

Must the taxing body exhaust its administrative reme-

dies and appear before the Board of Review? The statute provides that "any taxing body that has an interest in the decision
of the board of review on an assessment made by any local assessment officer, may ...

appeal such a decision to the Property

Tax Appeal Board for review. '' 220 The statute is worded in the
broadest possible fashion. Based upon the wording, it is the
authors' opinion that a taxing body need not appear before the
Board ,ofReview as a prerequisite to a proper appeal. No court,
however, has decided this issue.
In the third situation the taxpayer appeals to the Property
Tax Appeal Board. 221

Notice of the taxpayer's petition to all

interested bodies shall be deemed to have been given when served
upon the State's Attorney of the county from which the appeal
has been taken. 222 This notice is proper and binding on taxing
bodies. 223 The taxing bodies, after receipt of the notice, can in215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
2d 513,

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 589.2 (1975).

Id. § 590.1.
Id. § 592.1.
Id. § 589 (4).
Id.
Id. § 592.1 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 592.3.
Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill.
518, 272 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1971).
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224
tervene in the proceeding and become parties thereto.

3. Hearings Before the Property Tax Appeal Board
(a)

General Matters

The original parties to the controversy before the Property
Tax Appeal Board when the taxpayer appeals from a Board of
22 1
Review decision are the taxpayer and the Board of Review.
Statutory provisions have been enacted which provide for prompt
22 6

hearings of all such appeals.

An appeal can be determined on the basis of the material
submitted, without a formal hearing, if none of the parties to it
has requested one. 227 Assuming there is a decision without a
hearing, what evidence will be before the Property Tax Appeal
Board? The property card from the Board of Review is procured
and becomes part of the record.2 2 8 Appraisals, values of compar2
able properties and other written evidence may be submitted. 9
For commercial or income producing properties, income and ex224. Id. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 6 in pertinent part provides:
B. Such taxpayer or taxing body may become a party to the
appeal by filing in triplicate with the Clerk of the Board a Request
to Intervene, signifying his or its intention to become a party to the
appeal. Any interested taxing body desiring to become an intervening party in an appeal shall make its application to intervene within
30 days after notice has been given as provided in paragraph (A)
of Rule No. 3.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 6.
225. Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill.
2d 513, 517, 272 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1971).
226. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.2 (1975).
227. Id. § 592.3 (1975). Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
A. A hearing shall be granted if any party to the appeal so requests, and, upon motion of any party to the appeal or by direction
of the Property Tax Appeal Board, any appeal may be set down for
A decision may be written by the Property Tax Apa hearing ....
peal Board without a public hearing based on the material submitted
by the county and the appellant provided both parties waive their
right to a public hearing.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 5.
228. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 4 in pertinent part provides:
A. Upon receipt of the appellant's petition, the Clerk of the
Property Tax Appeal Board shall secure Form PTAB-6 and a copy
of the property record card of the subject property from the local
Board of Review showing the assessed valuation for the year and
for the property under appeal and cause such assessment record to
become a part of such appeal proceeding and record.
Id. at Rule 4(A).
229. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
I. The appellant, the County Board of Review, interested taxing
bodies or intervenors planning to present appraisals of the subject
property, proof of the value of allegedly comparable properties,
property record cards or other written evidence including exhibits
shall forward in duplicate, copies of such material or other written
evidence to the Property Tax Appeal Board before a hearing can be
set. Upon receipt of exhibits from either party, a copy will be sent
to all other interested parties by the Property Tax Appeal Board.
Id. at Rule 5 (I).
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pense figures can be submitted. 230 The county median level of
assessments will also be considered. 3 1 In addition, stipulations
may also be offered; however, these are not binding on the Prop232
erty Tax Appeal Board.
The Property Tax Appeal Board, on its own, can call for
more evidence.2 3,3 A rule of the Property Tax Appeal Board
would seem to indicate that the Board could go outside the
record made by the parties for facts upon which to base its
decision. 234 Other rules of the Board indicate that a decision
will be made only on the facts in the record made by the parties.2 3 5 Since the Property Tax Appeal Board's hearings are
230. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 (E) in pertinent part provides:
Should the owner of commercial or income producing property
elect to submit income and expense figures, such figures shall be the
actual income and expense figures audited from actual records.
Id. at Rule 5 (E).
231. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 4(D) in pertinent part provides:
The county median level of assessments will be considered where
sufficient probative evidence is presented indicating the estimate
of full market value of the subject property on the relevant real
property assessment date of January 1 or personal property assessment date of April 1.

Id. at Rule 4(D).
232. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
M. If a stipulation is agreed to by all interested parties, it may
be taken into consideration by the Property Tax Appeal Board. The
Board reserves the right to write their own decision based on the
facts, evidence and exhibits in the record.
Id. at Rule 5 (M).
233. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.3 (1975). Property Tax Appeal
Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:

E. The Board, any Member, or Hearing Officer may require the
production of any books, records, papers or documents that may be
material or relevant as evidence in any matter pending before the
Property Tax Appeal Board and necessary for the making of a just
decision.

K. At any stage of the hearing, or after all parties have completed the presentation of their evidence, the Property Tax Appeal
Board or Hearing Officer may call upon any party for further material or relevant evidence upon any issue.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 5(E) & (K).
234. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 4(C) provides that "the Property Tax Appeal Board may order a hearing continued for additional
testimony, evidence or exhibits or it may make such investigation concerning the appeal on its own initiative as it deems proper." Id. at Rule
4(C).
235. Property Tax Appeal Board Rules in pertinent part provide:
1A. The Property Tax Appeal Board shall determine the correct assessment of any parcel of real property or any personal property which is the subject of an appeal, based upon facts, evidence
and exhibits submitted and/or elicited and presented at an open
hearing.
5M. If a stipulation is agreed to by all interested parties, it may
be taken into consideration by the Property Tax Appeal Board. The
Board reserves the right to write their own decision based on the
facts, evidence and exhibits in the record.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rules 1 (A) & 5 (M).
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subject to review under the Administrative Review Act,23
23 7
ex parte contacts by it are reversible error.

6

any

Should a hearing on the taxpayer's petition be requested it
2 39
must be granted. 238 Such hearings may be held in Springfield
but are more commonly held in the county in which the property
is located.2 40 The hearing may be conducted by either the entire
Property Tax Appeal Board, a single member, or a designated
hearing officer. 2"4 These hearings are open to the public 242 and
the records of the hearings are public records open to inspection.2 43 However, it should be noted that it is the appellant who
may be required to furnish a court reporter. This imposed
burden is nondiscretionary in all cases in which the appellant is
2 44
seeking a reduction of $50,000 or more in assessed valuation.

236. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975).
237. Hazelton v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 48 Ill. App. 3d 348, 363 N.E.2d
44 (1977); North Shore Sanitary Dist. v. P.C.B., 2 Ill. App. 3d 797, 277
N.E.2d 754 (1972); Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 23 Ill. App.
2d 433, 163 N.E.2d 541 (1960).
238. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.3 (1975). Property Tax Appeal
Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
A. A hearing shall be granted if any party to the appeal so requests, and, upon motion of any party to the appeal or by direction
of the Property Tax Appeal Board, any appeal may be set down for
a hearing. The Board shall give notice to the interested parties of
the time, date and place of the hearings at least 20 days prior to
the hearing unless the 20 day period is specifically waived by all
the parties to the appeal.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 5 (A).
239. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5(C) provides that "any hearing may be conducted by the Property Tax Appeal Board at its offices
in Springfield or at any other location in Illinois selected by the Board."
240. Interview with Joseph F. Miller, Counsel to the Property Tax Appeal Board (July 29, 1976).
241. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 592.3, 592.5 (1975). Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
C. Hearings may be held before less than a majority of the
Members. of the Board, and the Chairman may assign Members or
Hearing Officers to hearings ....

or the Board may cause its Hearing

Officer to conduct such hearing and report his findings for affirmation or rejection.
H. Hearing Officers shall have the authority to administer oaths
and to examine, under oath, the petitioner appearing for the hearing,
or anyone else appearing at the hearing to testify or to offer evidence.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 5 (C) & (H).
242. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 41-6, ch. 120, § 592.3 (1975). Property
Tax Appeal Board Rule 5(D) provides that "hearings shall be open to
the public and shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure as the Board may make and promulgate."
243. Id. § 592.4.
244. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:

L. At a hearing, the Property Tax Appeal Board shall, at its

own discretion, require the appellant to furnish a court reporter on

any appeal. In all cases where the appellant is seeking a reduction
of $50,000 or more in assessed valuation, the appellant must provide

a court reporter at his own expense. The original certified transcript
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In the hearing, the appellant proceeds first followed by
other parties to the appeal who may also offer evidence. All parties are entitled to present rebuttal evidence. Unless advance
permission is given, parties are only allowed thirty minutes for
the presentation of evidence and ten minutes for cross-examination.2 '45
The same Property Tax Appeal Board Rules apply to
evidence admissible in an appeal in which no hearing was requested or given as apply to an appeal in which a hearing is conducted. The Property Tax Appeal Board has the same powers
to request additional evidence. In addition, the statute provides
that "formal rules of pleading, practice and evidence" shall be
246
eliminated.
The decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board must be
made by the majority of the board.247 No findings of fact are
248
necessary beyond fixing the assessed value of the property.
The decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board must within ten
days thereafter, be certified to the appellant and to the proper
authorities, including the Board of Review whose decision was
appealed, the County Clerk who extends taxes upon the assessment in question, and the County Collector who collects property
of such hearing shall be forwarded to the Springfield Office of the
Property Tax Appeal Board and shall become part of the Board's
official record of the proceedings on appeal. The court reporter's
certified transcript should be forwarded as soon as possible but no
later than thirty days without communicating the basis for the delay
to the Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 5 (L).
245. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 5 in pertinent part provides:
J. At the hearing, the appellant shall first introduce his case
into evidence, followed by the evidence of other parties to the appeal, in the order directed by the Property Tax Appeal Board or
Hearing Officer. All parties are entitled to rebuttal after all evidence of all the parties has been introduced. Unless more time is
granted in advance by the Board or the Hearing Officer, no party
to the hearing shall be allowed more than 30 minutes for the presentation of evidence nor more than 10 minutes for cross-examining the
evidence presented by any other party to the proceeding. Evidence
submitted -to the Board in documentary form may be made a part
of the record without time being taken for the document to be read
into the record if the Board or the Hearing Officer so orders.
Id. at Rule 5(J).
246. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.2 (1975).
247. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 4(F) provides that "a majority
of the Members of the Board is required to make a decision of the
Board." Id. at Rule 4(F).
248. In People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 22 Ill.
App. 3d 316, 317 N.E.2d 121 (1974), the court stated:
The findings of fact of the Property Tax Appeal Board are sufficient, having consideration for the very limited nature of its inquiry, viz., the correct assessment of the property subject to appeal.
The decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board (record at 186) correctly states the Board's function and jurisdiction and finds the correct assessed valuation on the property here involved is $13,650 for
land and $22,580 for improvements, or a total of $36,230. No further
detailed finding of facts by the Property Tax Appeal Board was necessary.
Id. at 323, 317 N.E.2d at 121.

19771

Review of Real Estate Assessments

It is noteworthy that the extentaxes upon such assessment. 24
sion of real estate taxes is not delayed by the Property Tax
Appeal Board's action.

(b)

25 0

The Burden of Proof

Of critical importance to a taxpayer is the burden of proof
he must satisfy to convince the Property Tax Appeal Board of
the justice of his complaint. The statute, specifically dealing
with the burden of proof problem between the taxpayer and the
Board of Review or taxing bodies, in pertinent part provides that
"the Board shall make a decision in each appeal or case heard
by it, and such decision shall be based upon equity and the weight
of evidence and not upon constructive fraud, and shall be binding
upon appellant and officials of government.

' 251

Although the

statute is clear, the Property Tax Appeal Board has contended
that the assessed valuation of the Board of Review was prima
facie correct and that the taxpayer had the burden of overcoming
that presumption. The courts, however, have specifically held
25 2
to the contrary.
In Western Illinois Power Co-op v. Property Tax Appeal
Board, the court considered the assessment of power lines which
were personal property. It reversed the Property Tax Appeal
Board and stated:

253

The opinion of the Property Tax Appeal Board contains the
following: "In the consideration of appeals by this Board, the
decision of the Board of Review is accorded a prima facie presumption of correctness. It is incumbent upon the appellant to
prove such decision to be erroneous and to further offer sufficient evidence to allow this Board to determine the correct valuation for the subject property.

*

*

*

We do not believe that the

appellant has borne its burden of proof with relation to any of
the assessment years in question."
249. ILL. RxV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975). Property Tax Appeal
Board 4(E) provides:
Whether a hearing is held in the appeal proceeding or not, the proceeding shall be terminated before the Property Tax Appeal Board
by the Board's making of a decision. The decision or order of the
Property Tax Appeal Board in any such appeal shall, within 10 days
after being made and entered, be certified to every party to the proceeding and to the proper authorities, including the Board of Review
whose decision was appealed, the County Clerk who extends taxes
upon the assessment in question, and the County Collector (Treasurer) who collects property taxes upon such assessment.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 4 (E).
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975).
251. Id.

252. Western Ill. Power Co-op v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill. App.
3d 16, 331 N.E.2d 286 (1975); People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax
Appeal Bd., 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 324-25, 317 N.E.2d 121, 127-28 (1974).

253. Western Ill. Power Co-op v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill,
App. 3d 16, 22-23, 331 N.E.2d 286, 291 (1975) (emphasis added).
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No authority has been cited for the proposition that the decision of the Board of Review is entitled to a "prima facie presumption of correctness" in appeals to the Property Tax Appeal
Board, nor have we found any authority which supports the proposition which, of course, imports the further concept that the
Property Tax Appeal Board will only disturb the findings and
conclusions of fact of the Board of Review unless they are shown
to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. We hold that
the findings and conclusions of fact of the Board of Review are
not to be afforded prima facie weight by the Property Tax Appeal Board.
It seems clear, from the provisions of section 111.4 of the
Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 120, § 592.4) that
the legislature has specifically stated the standard to be applied
by the Property Tax Appeal Board, and that standard must be
followed and applied by the Board. Where the statute creating
an agency prescribes the burden of proof to be applied by it in
the discharge of its duties, the standard must be the measure
by which its decisions are judged ...

The taxpayer, Board of Review and taxing bodies now stand on
an equal footing regarding the burden of proof. No longer can
the public officials rely on the authority of their office without
any substantive evidence to back up their assessments. The
Property Tax Appeal Board appears to have taken cognizance
of these decisions, as its rules are now in accord with the court's
5 4
pronouncement. 1
4.

JudicialReview of Property Tax Appeal Board Decisions

Notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision is given
to the parties within ten days of its rendition. 5 5 This decision is
reviewable by the courts pursuant to the Administrative Review
Act. '25
A complaint for administrative review must be filed
within thirty-five days from the date that a copy of the decision
sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby.-5 7 The circuit court hearing the matter under the Administrative Review Act will normally be the one sitting in the county
in which the hearing was held.25 ,8 The Property Tax Appeal

254. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975). Property Tax Appeal
Board Rule 4(B) provides that "all proceedings before the Property Tax
Appeal Board are de novo." Rule 4(D) provides that "the decision of
the Property Tax Appeal Board will be based on equity and the weight
of the evidence." Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 4(B), (D).
255. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975). See note 249 supra.
256. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.4 (1975).
Property Tax Appeal
Board Rule 4(G) provides that "final administrative decisions of the
Property Tax Appeal Board are subject to review under the provisions
of the Administrative Review Act." Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202,
at Rule 4(G).
257. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 267 (1975).
258. Id. § 268. The circuit court of the county wherein the subject
matter is situated or wherein any part of the transaction occurred may
also hear the matter.
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Board attempted by rule to charge the plaintiff with the cost of
the record.25 19 A recent court decision, however, declared the
2 0
rule invoked as being beyond the board's statutory powers. "
The parties to the hearing are originally the parties that
appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board.2 6 1 However,
taxing bodies which did not participate in the Property Tax
Appeal Board hearing can intervene in the administrative review
action.2 6 2 It seems only proper that the same rule of allowing
intervention should equally apply to taxpayers who did not participate in hearings conducted by the Property Tax Appeal
Board .261
The extent of the review of the Property Tax Appeal Board's
decision by a circuit court is specifically set forth in the Adminis26 41
trative Review Act. It states:
The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions
of law and of fact presented by the entire record before the court.
No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to
any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall
be held to be prima facie true and correct.
The first case to consider the standard to be used by a circuit
court in examining a Property Tax Appeal Board decision was
Will County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board.2 65
259. Id. ch. 120, § 592.4. Property Tax Appeal Board Rule 4(H) provides:
The required number of copies of all documents in an appeal file
necessary to complete the certification of the Property Tax Appeal
Board proceedings in answer to a complaint for Administrative Review will be prepared by the Property Tax Appeal Board at a cost
to the plaintiff of 25 cents per page. From the original certification
of proceedings, which will be filed with the Clerk of the Circuit
Court, copies of the proceedings will be prepared and forwarded to
the Attorney General, State's Attorney, the plaintiff in the Administrative Review and one copy will be retained as a permanent record for the Property Tax Appeal Board. An estimate of the cost of
preparing a certified record will be mailed to the plaintiff. Upon
receipt of the necessary payment, the Property Tax Appeal Board
will prepare certification of the proceedings.
Appeal Board Rules, supra note 202, at Rule 4 (H).
260. Champaign City Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 30
Ill. App. 3d 29, 331 N.E.2d 333 (1975).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 271 (1975).
262. Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill.
2d 513, 317, 272 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1971).
263. Compare Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill. 2d 491, 256 N.E.2d
1 (1970) (intervention allowed for adjoining landowner in declaratory
judgment action in building ordinance violation case) with Wheeling
Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 29 Ill. App. 3d 539, 331
N.E.2d 172 (1975) (intervention allowed for neighbors in declaratory
judgment action regarding zone ordinance) and City of Chicago v. Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank, 12 Ill. App. 3d 808, 299 N.E.2d 57 (1973) (intervention allowed by tenants in case involving demolition of their building
due to building ordinance violations).
264. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 274 (1975).
265. 48 Ill.
2d 513, 518, 272 N.E.2d 32, 35-36 (1971).
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The Board of Review attacked the Property Tax Appeal Board
decision stating "there is no competent substantial evidence to
support the findings and orders of the Property Tax Appeal
Board. ' 26 6 The court did not agree and upheld the Property Tax
Appeal Board's decision. However, the court did not indicate
what evidence evaluation test it used. This lack of precision has
2 7
been the subject of some -critical comment.
The question of the proper standard of review is still unsettled. A recent decision has mentioned a number of standards
in weighing the evidence and the Property Tax Appeal Board's
decision in an administrative review hearing. 26 8 It has mentioned tests of "against the manifest weight of the evidence,"
"whether there is competent evidence to support the judgment
of the lower court," "that an opposite conclusion be clearly evident" and "amply supported by competent evidence." 2 9 In a
totally erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutes, one
court has resurrected the constructive fraud doctrine as the
proper test to review the Property Tax Appeal Board's deci270
sion.
The findings by the circuit court upholding the Property Tax
Appeal Board's decision in an administrative review proceeding
can be extremely simple. It has been held that the court may

merely find that the Property Tax Appeal Board's determination
is warranted from the record, without stating any findings of
fact or propositions of law upon which the court's decision is
based. 27 ' If the Property Tax Appeal Board committed error,
the court cannot set an assessed valuation but must send the
27 2
case back to the Property Tax Appeal Board for its decision.
266. Id. at 519, 272 N.E.2d at 36 (1971).
267. 23 DEPAUL L. Rsv. 96, 102-04 (1972).
268. People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 22 Ill. App.
3d 316, 317 N.E.2d 121 (1974).
269. Id. at 323, 317 N.E.2d at 126-27. Cf. Western Ill. Power Co-op v.
Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill. App. 3d 16, 331 N.E.2d 286 (1974).
270. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill. App.
3d 466, 469, 473, 331 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1975).
271. In People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 22 Ill.
App. 3d 316, 317 N.E.2d 121 (1974), the court stated:
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in not following her motion
that the court make findings of fact and state propositions of law
upon which its opinion was based, referring to section 12(3) of the
Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 275(3)).
We believe, however, that the court's finding "that the Property Tax
Appeal Board in making its determination is supported by the evidence adduced before it and that its determination is warranted by
the entire record" is sufficient in this case and that the failure to
make any further definitive findings or to recite any propositions
of law in this case is not reversible error.
Id. at 324, 317 N.E.2d at 127-28.
272. Western Ill. Power Co-op. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill.
App. 3d 16, 23, 331 N.E.2d 286, 291 (1975); Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Property Tax Appeal Bd., 29 Ill. App. 3d 465, 473-74, 331 N.E.2d 122, 12930 (1975),
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5.

Workload of the Property Tax Appeal Board

The staff of the Property Tax Appeal Board consists of three
persons who act as hearing officers, two clerks and three stenographers. The eight staff members and three Property Tax
Appeal Board members operated on a total budget of $187,060 for
fiscal year 1977.27 3 The total number of petitions received by the
Property Tax Appeal Board for the 1975 tax year was 3,465274
requiring administrative expenditures by the Board of approximately $137,000.271 Thus, the average cost to process the
1975 petitions was $39.53. Due to a lack of personnel, detailed statistics are available only for the tax years 1970-1972;
however, these statistics indicate a substantial workload being
carried on by the Property Tax Appeal Board.2 76 Surprisingly,
petitioners sparingly use their rights under the Administrative
Review Act to challenge the Property Tax Appeal Board's
adverse decisions. 277 This fact -may be indicative of a feeling
on the part of most petitioners that they have received a fair
hearing.
6.

Payment of Taxes Under Protest by Taxpayer

A downstate taxpayer has a second possible method of having his assessment reviewed after receiving a decision from the
Board of Review. He may pay the taxes under protest and
273. Oral reply of Joseph L. Miller of the Property Tax Appeal Board
(Jan. 3, 1977) to letter of Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 8, 1976).
274. The total number of petitions received by the Property Tax Appeal Board for tax years 1970 through 1975 were as follows:
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

-

739
5742
1858
760
1811
3465

Letter of Joseph L. Miller of the Property Tax Appeal Board to Alan
S. Ganz (Sept. 10, 1976).

275. Id.
276. Id. See Appendix B, p. 89 infra.
277. The number of administrative review appeals filed for tax years
1970 through 1975 is as follows:
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

-

11
29
45
27
31
23

Letters from Joseph L. Miller of the Property Tax Appeal Board to Alan
S. Ganz (Sept. 10, 1976 & Feb. 14, 1977).
From the number of decisions certified to the appellants, it appears
that on a percentage basis, the number of administrative reviews may
be higher on 1975 decisions. The trend seems to be up because there
is no longer any cost for filing an appeal. Virtually all of the decisions
of the Property Tax Appeal Board are upheld. There have been remand-

ments from the appellate court in the Consolidation Coal case and the
Chrysler case.

74

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11: 17

file objections to the Collector's Application for Judgment. A
recent statutory amendment makes it clear that a taxpayer must
make an election between the two possible methods. The
2 18
amended statute in pertinent part provides::
If a petition is filed by a taxpayer, the taxpayer is precluded
from filing objections based upon valuation, as may otherwise
be permitted by Sections 194, 195 and 235 of this Act. (Chap.
120, Secs. 675, 676, 716, Ill. Rev. Stat.) . However, any taxpayer
not satisfied with the decision of the board of review as such
decision pertains to the assessment of his property for taxation
purposes, need not appeal such decision to the Property Tax
Appeal Board for review before seeking relief in the courts.
While a taxpayer paying his taxes under protest may obtain
judicial review without going to the Property Tax Appeal Board,
an election for such review would subject the taxpayer to all
the uncertainties of the constructive fraud doctrine. It is doubtful that any knowledgeable attorney would advise a taxpayer
to proceed in this manner. Furthermore, the taxpayer who does
not appear before the Board of Review is precluded from filing
a tax objection for failure to exhaust his "administrative remedies. ' 27 9 On the other hand, a taxpayer may fail to appear before the Board of Review and yet be able to file his complaint
with the Property Tax Appeal Board.
IV.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE COOK COUNTY

REAL ESTATE ASSESSMENT REVIEW SYSTEM

1. Differences in Review Between Cook County and
Downstate Counties
Cook County real estate taxpayers have a three-step system
which consists of the Assessor, Board of Appeals and circuit
court. Downstate taxpayers have a four-step system consisting
of (a) Assessor, Supervisor of Assessments, Board of Assessors
or Township Assessor, (b) Board of Review, (c) Property Tax
Appeal Board and (d) the circuit court. Downstate taxpayers
may also make a binding election to file tax objections to the
Collector's Application for Judgment or to proceed before the
Property Tax Appeal Board. If the tax objection route is chosen,
there is no difference between the review procedure for downstate taxpayers and Cook County taxpayers. The difference in
rights of Cook County and downstate taxpayers arises when the
278. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 592.1 (1975)

omitted).

(emphasis added; footnote

279. People ex rel. Needham v. Abbott Estates, 47 Ill.
2d 491,'497, 265
N.E.2d 612, 616 (1970); Shappert Engineering Co. v. Weitemeyer, 34 Ill. 2d
97, 213 N.E.2d 530 (1966); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d
477, 202 N.E.2d 543 (1964); In re County Collector, 11 Ill. App. 3d 290,

296 NE.2d 361 (1973).
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Property Tax Appeal Board is chosen as the reviewing authority
by downstate taxpayers. The following comparison is between
the tax objection route afforded the Cook County taxpayer and
the downstate taxpayer's rights under the Property Tax Appeal
Board system.
(a)

Payment of Taxes

The downstate taxpayer need not worry about payment of
his taxes under protest and whether his protest form or the
amount paid is proper. The Cook County taxpayer must pay
the proper amount of his taxes under protest accompanied by a
legally sufficient protest form. If the Cook County taxpayer does
not do so, he can obtain no judicial review.
(b)

Notice

It is required by statute that a downstate taxpayer be given
clear notice that he may appeal to the Property Tax Appeal
Board from an unsatisfactory decision of the Board of Review.
The Assessor of Cook County, however, has no statutory duty to
give notice that his decision may be appealed to the Board of
Appeals. Furthermore the Assessor does not give any notice
whatsoever as to his decisions concerning complaints. Thus, the
Cook County real estate owner is left in the dark as to when or
how he can -contest his assessment. His need for counsel at the
very outset is apparent.
The downstate taxpayer, after receiving notice of his right
to appeal to the Property Tax Appeal Board, has definite knowledge of the commencement of a thirty day period during which
he may file his complaint with the Property Tax Appeal Board.
The Cook County taxpayer, however, must be ever vigilant in
watching for the legal advertisements of the Board of Appeals
or must personally contact the board to find out the time period
during which the Board of Appeals will accept his complaint. If
he misses the date, his case for judicial review is lost. Moreover,
there is some question as to whether the Board of Appeals should
be accepting complaints before the board's published filing dates.
(c)

Hearing

The downstate taxpayer at his Property Tax Appeal Board
hearing has definite rights. A decision must be made on the evidence presented, which is recorded by a court reporter, and without any ex parte contacts by the Board. The downstate taxpayer
and the assessing authorities stand on an equal footing in proving
the assessed valuation of the property. The Board's decisions are
to be based upon equity and the weight of the evidence and not
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upon constructive fraud. Moreover, the Board's decision is subject to review under the Administrative Review Act.
A Cook County real estate -owner, on the other hand, is faced
with a hearing before the Board of Appeals. The status of the
Board as a judicial body for all purposes is questionable. In
addition the Board does not make a mechanical recording of what
transpires. Its decisions can be based upon the evidence presented, upon ex parte contacts, upon its own investigators' testimony, upon its own experience or upon the Assessor's assessment. For this reason the taxpayer is not able to cross-examine
witnesses or non-parties who might have influenced the Board
in its decision. Furthermore the Assessor cannot be called as a
witness as a matter of right by the taxpayer, and as a matter of
practice, the Assessor seldom if ever presents testimony. Of
greatest importance, however, is the fact that the taxpayer's
burden of proof is unknown, a systemic problem created in part
by the failure of the Board to publish rules setting forth its
methods of determining market value.
As to third parties, any Cook County taxpayer may attack
an underassessment or participate in a hearing but no taxing
body may do so. This is to be contrasted to third party downstate taxpayers who cannot participate in a Property Tax Appeal Board hearing; however, taxing bodies may do so.
(d)

Securing JudicialReview
The downstate taxpayer and proper public officials receive
notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision within ten
days after it is rendered. The Cook County taxpayer, however,
receives no notice from the Board of Appeals if there is no
change in his assessment. In addition the taxpayer is not advised
of the basis of any change made by the Board of Appeals but
only that a change has been made. However, notice is sent by
the Board of Appeals to the Assessor if there is a change, giving
the reason for the change -and the errors of the Assessor.
The downstate taxpayer need not keep alert to the time in
which he must file an objection to the Collector's Application
for Judgment, which time is not in any statute or court rule.
His timetable for an appeal from the Property Tax Appeal Board
is clearly set forth in the Administrative Review Act. The Cook
County taxpayer, on the other hand, must be ever vigilant to
determine the provisions of the court's order regarding the filing of objections to the County Collector's Application for Judgment. The timing of the decision of the Board of Appeals is in
no way related to the time period during which objections must
be filed by a Cook County taxpayer to the County Collector's
Application for Judgment.
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Finally, the downstate taxpayer's burden of proof in setting
aside the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision is also clearly
set forth in the Administrative Review Act. The Cook County
taxpayer, in his objection to the Collector's Application for Judgment, is faced with the doctrine of constructive fraud with all
of its uncertainties and unfairness. The Cook County taxpayer
has no real method of effectively obtaining direct judicial review
of any procedural or substantive abuses by the Board. Although
he can secure a writ of certiorari when the Board of Appeals exceeds its jurisdiction or proceeds illegally, this writ is worthless
to a taxpayer in the average case.
2. Possible Bases for Differing Treatment of Cook
County and Downstate Taxpayers
There are dramatic differences between the review of real
estate assessments in Cook County and the remainder of Illinois.
Are such disparities supported by differing facts? The population
of Cook County for 1975 was 5,365,400 whereas the population for
the rest of the state was 5,779,600.28" Cook County, for the tax
year 1975, had 1,287,490 parcels of real estate with a valuation,
as assessed by the Assessor of Cook County, of $13,602,793,113.281
These figures do not contain any railroad property. 282 The
remainder of the State of Illinois, other than Cook County, for
the tax year 1974 had 2,796,711 parcels of assessable real estate,
excluding railroad parcels, with an assessed valuation of $22,988,
989,184.28 3 Unfortunately, statistics that compare the classes of
280. Population figures based on BUREAU OF THE CENSUS Pop. REP., Series P-26, No. 75-13 (Aug., 1976).
281. The breakdown by the Cook County assessment ordinance passed
December 17, 1973, applicable to the 1974 tax year and thereafter, for
the 1975 tax year is as follows:
Assessed Valuation
Number of Parcels
Class
$ 469,134,780
177,603
1
5,992,254,989
992,935
2
1,420,631,000
3
44,852

(exempt property)

4

(exempt property)

63,463

5,573,366,854

classify from

8,687

147,404,490

information
TOTALS

1,287,540

$13,602,792,113

5
Special

-

unable to
assessor's

There were 51,587 parcels of exempt properties. Reply of Theodore M.
Swain, Chief Deputy Assessor, (Oct. 29, 1976) to letter from Alan S.
Ganz (July 27, 1976).

282. The Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs assessed
6,155 parcels of railroad property in Cook County. ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
120, § 498 (1975). See letter from Mr. Theodore M. Swain, Chief Deputy
Assessor, to Alan S. Ganz (Oct. 29, 1976).
283. Letter from Jean H. Hostetler, Research and Standard Supervisor,
Department of Local Government Affairs, to Alan S. Ganz (Aug. 6, 1976).
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real estate in Cook County with the remainder of the state are
28
unavailable.
As between the Board of Appeals and the Property Tax
Appeal Board, statistics are available. Cook County taxpayers
file many more complaints with the Board of Appeals than down2
state taxpayers do with the Property Tax Appeal Board. 15
This propensity could be due to the ease of filing and prosecuting
complaints before the Board of Appeals without a full hearing
requiring the presentation of witnesses by the taxpayer.
Cook County taxpayers have substantially fewer legal rights
than downstate taxpayers. In comparison with other major
taxes of Illinois, the Cook County real estate tax is the only one
not covered by the Administrative Review Act.28 6 Is this difference constitutionally discriminatory? The facts do not seem to
justify the difference. Taxpayer's counsel raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the differing review systems in the LaSalle
Bank case.2817 However, the court chose to ignore it.
3. Potential Changes in the Cook County
Assessment System
It is the authors' opinion that the Cook County system for
reviewing real estate assessments is unconscionable and without
any rational factual basis. This system has no institutional
checks upon the Assessor of Cook County or the Board of
Appeals. Since their actions cannot be effectively challenged in
the courts, the taxpayer is totally dependent on their good will,
honesty and competency. The Cook County taxpayer should not
284. Id.
285. According to the 1976 budget the Board of Appeals has a staff
of 44 people while the Property Tax Appeal Board has 10 people. The
budget of the Board of Appeals in 1976 was $664,784 while the Property Tax Appeal Board had a 1977 budget of $187,060 and a 1976
budget of $137,000. In 1970, 13,496 complaints were filed with the Board
of Appeals, 10,311 complaints in 1971, 16,306 complaints in 1972, 15,956
complaints in 1973, 20,090 complaints in 1974 and 22,262 complaints in
1975. Meanwhile, in 1970, 739 complaints were filed with the Property
Tax Appeal Board, 5,742 complaints in 1971, 1,858 complaints in 1972, 760
complaints in 1973, 1,811 complaints in 1974 and 3,465 complaints in 1975.
The average cost per complaint in the 1975 tax year for the Board of
Appeals was $28.86 while it was $39.53 for the Property Tax Appeal
Board.
286. See Appendix C, p. 90, infra.
287. 57 Ill. 2d 318, 319, 312 N.E.2d 252, 255 (1974). See also, Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant at Point III, id., in which it was argued that "Chapter
120, Pars. 593-607, ILL. REV. STAT. (which established the Cook County
Board of Appzeals) are invalid as applied by reason of repugnancy to
the federal and state equal protection and due process clauses and Article
IV, Section 13 (special legislation) and Article IX, Section 4(b) of the
1970 Illinois Constitution." The chances of the court accepting such an
argument are slim. Lenhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356 (1973); Williams v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 423, 362 N.E.2d 1030
(1977).
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be treated any less favorably than downstate taxpayers or payers
of other major Illinois taxes. Statutory restrictions on taxing
official's conduct is a necessity for a civilized society.
There are three institutions which could possibly change the
Cook County system. The first is the Illinois Supreme Court.
The court could redefine the constructive fraud doctrine to make
it a mathematical concept and reduce the percentage differences
between the Assessor or Board of Appeals and the taxpayer to a
minimal amount. For example, if there were a 10% difference
between the Assessor's assessed valuation and the taxpayer's,
then the doctrine of constructive fraud would be satisfied and the
circuit court could hear the matter de novo on the preponderance
of the evidence without any presumptive weight being given to
the Assessor's or Board of Appeals' assessment figure.
The court could also redefine the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as it relates to the Board of Appeals.
The rationale could be that the exhaustion doctrine only applies
to administrative bodies that conduct "on the record" hearings.
Since the Board of Appeals' decisions are not determined on any
record but possibly on extraneous matter which the taxpayer's
counsel has not been able to subject to cross-examination, its
decisions should not come within the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Unfortunately, the record of the Illinois
Supreme Court in tax cases does not indicate that the court
would be receptive to any argument favoring a change in the
current review procedures in Cook County.
A second institution which could change the current system
is the Cook County Board of Commissioners. An argument could
be made that by the ordinance setting the assessment at a fixed
percentage of market value the doctrine of constructive fraud
has been abolished. The argument is based on the premise that
once the taxpayer demonstrates that his assessment is in excess
of the fixed percentage of market value, he has proven the assessment to be in violation of the ordinance. However, in order for
the taxpayer to do so, he must of course establish fair market
value. There is little reason to believe that the courts would
not require the taxpayer to carry the burden of proving constructive fraud to establish a fair market value with its allowable
"margin of error" given to the Assessor in his determination of
fair market value. The Board of Commissioners might also,
under the county's home rule powers, make some improvements
in the system. 281 Such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope
of this article.
288.

ILL. CONST.

art. VII, § 6 (1970).

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11: 17

80

The third institution is the Illinois legislature. The legislature has already acted in establishing the Property Tax Appeal
Board. It could similarly act in changing the Cook County system.2- 1" The only real hope of Cook County taxpayers is for
changes from the legislature.
(a)

Major Legislative Changes

Of prime importance is the abolition of the doctrine of
constructive fraud which prevents effective judicial review of
real estate assessments in Cook County. This doctrine is inconsistent with any sense of fair play for the burdened taxpayer.
The rule is unclear and unfair. As has been previously demonstrated, there are no reasons for continuing the bar to review
of Cook County real estate tax assessments posed by the doctrine
of constructive fraud. Judicial review of excessive assessments
would not violate the separation of powers, would not encroach
on a legislative function and is not barred by the Illinois Constitution.29 0 Clearly the legislature can and should abolish the
doctrine of constructive fraud. All the following suggested
changes to the assessment system presuppose the abolition of the
doctrine of constructive fraud.
Another possible solution would be to require the Board of
Appeals to act as an administrative tribunal subject to the Administrative Review Act. This would be the same type of review
now had by downstate taxpayers. Assessed valuation complaints
would then be taken out of the Collector's Application for Judgment. Under the present system requiring the payment of all
taxes in advance of any complaint being filed, the Collector's
Application for Judgment makes no sense for assessed valuation
complaints. The Application for Judgment deals with delinquent
taxes. Assessed valuation complaints do not logically belong in
the action since all taxes are paid.
Direct judicial review would serve to remedy the injustice
currently imposed upon the Cook County taxpayer. Instead of
having to meet the almost impossible burden of having to prove
fraud, whether actual or constructive, before the taxpayer can
obtain relief from an excessive assessment, the taxpayer would
be able to present his case fully, and the decision of the Board
of Appeals would be subject to attack if it was against the manifest weight of the evidence or not supported by substantial
evidence.
The main argument against applying the Administrative.
Review Act to the assessed valuation complaints of Cook County
289. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b) (1970).
290. See text accompanying notes 108-28 supra.
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taxpayers is based upon the volume of those complaints. For
the 1975 tax year, 22,262 complaints were filed with the Board
of Appeals. Could the Board of Appeals handle such a case load?
Could the Assessor furnish enough personnel to testify? Could
the Circuit Court of Cook County handle the Administrative
Review Act appeals? The Circuit Court of Cook County had approximately 1,000 excessive assessed valuation constructive fraud
cases for the tax year 1975. The fear has been expressed that if
the Administrative Review Act is made applicable to assessed
valuation complaints, the volume of such complaints would increase to an intolerable level.
There are two arguments against such fears. First, the
quality of justice for Cook County taxpayers should not be determined by the workloads of public officials or the courts. Since
the taxpayers are paying $1.5 billion in taxes, a small increase
in the expenditures of the various system components to insure justice is reasonable. Secondly, there is no assurance that
the Board of Appeal's case load and that of the courts would
be excessive. If complainants had to prove up a case before the
Board of Appeals rather than just filing complaints and having
perfunctory hearings, the number of complaints filed might
drop. Moreover, the experience of the Property Tax Appeal
Board indicates that very few taxpayers file appeals under the
Administrative Review Act. The dearth of cases under the
Administrative Review Act in the 101 counties outside Cook
County serves as support for the authors' conclusion that the
availability of judicial review will result in excessive assessments
being cured at the administrative level. Finally, the courts in
Cook County have shown no difficulty in handling the many
other Administrative Review Act appeals coming up under other
state taxes in Cook County.
It has been suggested that review under the Administrative
Review Act is essentially the same as review by a court applying the doctrine of constructive fraud.2 9' 1 There are, in fact,
major differences in the burdens carried by the taxpayer under
the two systems of review.
If a downstate taxpayer chooses the Property Tax Appeal
Board as the reviewing authority, he is guaranteed a hearing
complete with procedural safeguards. The downstate taxpayer
and the assessing authority are on equal ground in proving the
correct assessed valuation of the property. The Board's decision
must be based upon the manifest weight of the evidence and upon
equity. Further, the decision of the Board is subject to review
under the Administrative Review Act. The standard of review
291. Comment, Real Property Taxation in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 481,
489.
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under the act is whether the Board's decision is based upon the
manifest weight of the evidence adduced at the hearing, and
there must be substantial evidence to support the administrative
findings.
The Cook County taxpayer, on the other hand, has his only
"hearing" before the Board of Appeals. At this hearing there are
no procedural safeguards. The Cook County taxpayer is afforded
no direct judicial review. He must pay his taxes, in full, under
protest and file a specific objection to the Collector's Application
for Judgment. The Cook County taxpayer's defense of overvaluation is only heard if he can prove fraud; either actual or
constructive. As has been fully demonstrated earlier, proving
fraud is no easy matter, and the Cook County taxpayer is never
on equal footing with the assessing authorities.
Therefore, even though the downstate taxpayer does not
have a de novo hearing in the circuit court, the hearing afforded
at the administrative level is clearly efficacious. The overwhelming burden which must be met by the Cook County taxpayer in
proving fraud is much greater than the "manifest weight of the
evidence" burden carried by the downstate taxpayer. Absent
proof of fraud, the Cook County taxpayer will never be afforded
a hearing on what is the correct assessed valuation of his real
estate. The General Assembly should act.
A second alternative would be to maintain the Board of
Appeals as a place for a quick, inexpensive hearing for complaints. The Board would continue its present practice of not
affording a full due process hearing with complete evidence and
cross-examination. In effect, the Board would be a rough sieve
giving relief to some taxpayers. However, any requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Board should
be abolished because of the Board's lack of a full hearing. The
taxpayer should be given the opportunity to either go to the
Board or seek review of the Assessor's assessment in a trial de
novo in the circuit court wherein the defendant would be the
Assessor.
A third solution would be the abolition of the Board of
Appeals. It is functioning at the present time as an administrative body as distinguished from a judicial body. The decisions
of the Board of Appeals are not subject to judicial review. The
Board of Appeals reviews the actions of the Assessor of Cook
County. In effect an administrative body, the Board of Appeals,
is reviewing the determination of an administrative officer, the
Assessor. A trial de novo could be had in the Circuit Court of
Cook County directly from the Assessor's decision regarding the
assessment without any intervening body hearing the matter.
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Some changes should also be made in other areas. Taxpayers
should receive reasonable interest on any real estate tax refund
obtained as a result of their assessments being lowered by court
action. Thus, the burden of waiting for the refund could be alleviated by interest. The imposition of interest on refunds paid
by the county may also provide an impetus for the county to
expedite the review process. Currently, taxing bodies pay no
interest on refunds and, therefore, unjustly benefit from an
"interest-free loan." Furthermore, the Assessor and Board of
Appeals should, by statute, be required to give notice to taxpayers of their rights similar to the notice given to downstate
taxpayers.
At the present time, there is a waste of judicial and assessing officials' energies. Real estate is assessed routinely once
every four years in Cook County. Assume that the taxpayer
challenges his quadrennial assessment before the Assessor and
the Board of Appeals at the earliest possible time. Later he
takes the matter to the circuit court and prevails. The court's
judgment is not res judicata for the remaining three years of the
quadrennial assessment even though there has been no physical
change in the property.29 2 This result should be changed.
Finally, the various components of the assessing and review
system should be required to keep meaningful statistics. What
types of property owners are appealing? Who is getting relief?
What is the average amount of relief given? These and many
other statistics should be public knowledge.
V.

CONCLUSION

To paraphrase Jean Baptiste Colbert, the Cook County real
estate taxpayer is being plucked to the tune of approximately
1.5 billion dollars per tax year and cannot even HISS! The doctrine of constructive fraud prevents the Cook County real estate
taxpayer from obtaining any meaningful judicial review of the
Assessor's or Cook County Board of Appeals decisions concerning the Cook County taxpayer's real estate tax assessment. Proof
of assessment overvaluations from 1584% to 3.8% according to
Illinois Supreme Court decisions, was insufficient to prove constructive fraud so as to permit the court to review the real estate
tax assessment. Since the Illinois Supreme Court has not and
will not act to remedy this injustice, Cook County taxpayers
292. People ex rel. County Collector v. Bostwick, 33 Ill.2d 74, 78, 210
N.E.2d 189, 191 (1965).
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must and should take their case for reform to the Illinois General Assembly.
Downstate taxpayers already have an excellent system
for
administrative and judicial review of their real estate tax assessments. They are given notice by statute of important times
and places to file appeals regarding their real estate tax assessments as distinguished from Cook County taxpayers who receive
no notice. Downstate taxpayers are entitled as a matter of right
to a full hearing before the Property Tax Appeal Board concerning their real estate tax assessments, with statutorily guaranteed
rights to a full due process hearing without ex parte contacts
by the Board. Downstate taxpayers then are able to have the
decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board reviewed pursuant
to the Administrative Review Act, which review is governed by
statutorily prescribed standards.
Cook County taxpayers have no real substantive rights
regarding the judicial review of their real estate tax assessments.
A radical solution to the Cook County taxpayer's dilemma would
be the abolition by the General Assembly of the Cook County
Board of Appeals and the requirement that the circuit court decide assessments de novo with the Assessor's valuation being
given no presumptive weight. Alternatively, decisions of the
Board of Appeals could be made subject to the Administrative
Review Act. In any system, the correct assessed valuation should
be proven by either the Assessor or taxpayer by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Whatever format is adopted, the Assessor should be made
a mandatory party. At present, when the Cook County taxpayer
files an objection to the Collector's Application for Judgment,
only the Collector, not the Assessor, is the party plaintiff. This
procedure, to a certain degree, insulates the Assessor from the
proceedings. For example, interrogatories may not be served on
the Assessor. The taxpayer should have the right to proceed
directly against the Assessor who is the cause of his grievance.
There is no reason for the present Cook County system to
exist. It is an invitation to proceedings summary in nature and
arbitrary in result. The Cook County real estate taxing system
further breeds disrespect in taxpayers because of the system's
obvious injustice. Change in the Cook County real estate assessment system must and should be accomplished by the Illinois
General Assembly.
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APPENDIX

A-I

Survey of cases in which an excessive valuation percentage was alleged
but constructive fraud was not found*

Morningside
Hts. 1

2

M.D.B.K.W., Inc.
Hotel - 1961
Hotel - 1962

$

Assessed
Valuation

Fair Cash
Value

36,000**

21,000'*

36,150
38,662
128,440

17,200

17,200
86,000

Excessive
Valuation
Difference Percentage
$

15,000
18,950
21,462
42,440

71.4%
110.2
124.8
49.3

Farm
S.B.A. Co.
Tract I
10,200
5.9
183,700
173,500
(taxpayer)
3.8
6,700
183,700
177,000
(trial court)
Tract II
34.0
14,500
(taxpayer)
57,500
43,000
9,700
20.3
57,500
47,800
(trial court)
157,500
120.4
385,000
127,500
LansI
67.0
330,981,256
496,471,885
Gulf M. & O.R.R.5 827,453,141
Chicago &
73.5
36,750,000
50,000,000
86,750,000
N.W. Ry."
7
33.0
1,609,935
4,830,000
St. Louis
6,439,935
8
Robison
Land &
21,830
128.4
17,000
building
38,830
20,913
174.3
12,000
32,913
Land
58-83
274
372.4-230.1
216-191
Front footage
46.7
Texas Co.!
147.0
Allyn 1 o
67.0
40,003
100,008
60,005
Allied Oil Corp."
2
Hendrickson
Taxpayer
42.7
113,550
162,000
48,450
value # 1
Taxpayer
76.0
92,000
70,000
162,000
value #2
Taxpayer
94,000
138.3
162,000
68,000
value #3
13
108,646
100.0
217,290
108,644
Atwater
4
202,726 1584.0
215,526
12,800
C.U. Lime Wks.'
13,898
194.3
20,998
7,100
Norton' 5
57,331
28.6
257,731
200,400
Harding'11
33,550
44.7
108,550
75,000
Bourne',7
* For those cases in which the only figure referred to by the court
was the excessive valuation percentage, the assessed valuation figure and
the fair cash value figure are omitted.
**

Debased to 55%

1. People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc., 45 Ill. 2d 338,
259 N.E.2d 27 (1970).
2. People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 209, 221 N.E.
650 (1966).
3. People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d
233 (1966).
4. People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543
(1964).
5. People ex rel. Callahan v. Gulf, Mobile & O.R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 66,
132 N.E.2d 554, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956).
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6. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Department of Revenue, 6 Ill. 2d 278, 128
N.E.2d 722 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956).
7. People ex rel. Schmulbach v. City of St. Louis, 498 Ill. 491, 97
N.E.2d 252 (1951).
8. People ex rel. Johnson v. Robison, 406 Ill. 280, 94 N.E.2d 151
(1950).
9. People ex rel. Tennyson v. Texas Co., 406 Ill. 120, 92 N.E.2d 142
(1950).
10. People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn, 393 Ill. 154, 65 N.E.2d 392
(1946).
11. People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp., 388 Ill. 219, 57 N.E.2d
859 (1944).
12. People ex rel. Hellyer v. Hendrickson, 373 Ill. 99, 25 N.E.2d 507
(1940).
13. People ex rel. Harding v. Atwater, 362 Ill. 546, 1 N.E.2d 46 (1936).
14. People ex rel. McDonough v. Chicago Union Lime Works Co., 361
Ill. 304, 198 N.E. 1 (1935).
15. People ex rel. Nash v. Norton, 358 Ill. 272, 193 N.E. 129 (1934).
16. Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237, 178 N.E. 71 (1931).
17. People ex rel. Thompson v. Bourne, 242 Ill. 61, 89 N.E. 690 (1909).
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APPENDIX A-II
Survey of cases in which an excessive valuation percentage was alleged
and constructive fraud was found.*
Excessive
Valuation
Assessed
Fair Cash
Percentage
Difference
Value
Valuation

Anderson1

$

$

$

Belt Ry.2

Am. Refrig.3
4
Chicago B. & Q.R.R.5
Chicago B. & Q.R.R.
Gulf M. & O.R.R.6
Chicago & N.W. Ry.

288,181

161,000

127,181

7

1956-58
1959
Chicago B. & Q.R.R.8
Gulf M. & Q.R.R.9
Chicago B. & Q.R.R.10
Turk 11

Chicago M. St. P. & P .12
13
Wilson
Schmuh14
Gillespie'.5
55' Lot
25' Lot
Grand Trunk]"
17
St. Louis Bridge
s
Wiggins Ferry'
Ill. Cent. R. 1 9
0
Harding2
2
Stewart l
North Block
South Block
Chicago B.&Q. R.R.22
2
St. Louis Elec. Bridge 3
Construct.
costs
Replacement
costs
Income
24

K.&H. Bridge

59.5%
100.0
76.5
108.0-94.5
100.0
100.0
134.2
82.0
82.0
100.0
82.0
228.4
42.9
181.2
575.7

82,500

25,000

57,500

43,200

15,360

27,840

70,500
20,000
3,486,520
7,875,000
339,910

35,000
12,500
2,150,018
2,877,080
157,120

35,500
7,500
1,336,502
4,997,920
182,790

101.4
60.0
62.2
173.7
116.3
62.2
262.5

3,750
3,100

1,600
1,300

2,150
1,800

134.4
138.4
100.0

1,551,428

1,064,333

487,095

45.8

1,551,428
1,551,428

885,704
1,010,312

665,724
541,116

75.2
53.5
150.0

* For those cases in which the only figure referred to by the court
was the excessive valuation percentage, the assessed valuation figure and
the fair cash value figure are omitted.
1. People ex rel. Skidmore v. Anderson, 56 Ill. 2d 334, 307 N.E.2d
391 (1974).
2. People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry., 37 Ill. 2d 158, 226 N.E.2d 265
(1967).
3. People ex tel. County Collector v. American Refrigerator Transit,
33 Ill. 2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694 (1965).
4. People ex rel. Musso v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 33 Ill. 2d 88, 210
N.E.2d 196 (1965), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,384 U.S. 213
(1966).
5. People ex rel. Korzen v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 32 Ill. 2d 554, 209
N.E.2d 649 (1965).
6. People ex rel. Enrietta v. Gulf, Mobile & O.R.R., 29 Ill. 2d 605,
195 N.E.2d 174 (1963).
7. People ex rel. Schmulbach v. City of St. Louis, 498 Ill. 491, 97
N.E.2d 780 (1963).
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8. People ex tel. Dallas v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 26 Ill. 2d 292, 186
N.E.2d 335 (1962).
9. People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile & O.R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 104,
174 N.E.2d 182 (1961).
10. People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174
N.E.2d 175 (1961).
11. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513 (1945).
12. People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Peoria
R.R., 381 Ill. 58, 44 N.E.2d 566 (1942).
13. People e± rel. McGaughey v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5
(1937).
14. People ex rel. McDonough v. Schmuhl, 359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731
(1935).
15. People ex rel. Wangelin v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 192 N.E. 664
(1934).
16. People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk W.R., 357 Ill. 493, 192
N.E. 645 (1934).
17. People ex rel. Wangelin v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 357 Ill. 245, 191
N.E. 300 (1934).
18. People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191
N.E. 296 (1934).
19. People ex rel. McDonough v. Illinois Cent. R., 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E.
82 (1934).
20. Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930).
21. People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 (1924).
22. People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 300 Ill. 399, 133
N.E. 325 (1921).
23. People ex rel. Little v. St. Louis Elec. Bridge Co., 290 Ill. 307,
125 N.E.280 (1919).
24. People ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 287
Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 467 (1919), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
258 U.S. 613 (1922).
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APPENDIX C

Major Illinois taxes subject to review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act*

Tax
Income

Amount
$1,572,271,057

Percentage
of total
State
Revenue
Raised by
State Taxes
35.5%

Tax Statutory Provisions of
Ill. Rev.
Stat.

Administrative
Review Act
Provisions

Chap. 120,
Par. 1-101

Par. 12-1201
et seq.

et seq.

Cook

None

1,539,697,391

County
Real
Estate
Taxes
Occupa
tion &
Use
(Retailers' Occupation, Use,
Service
Occupation,
and Service

1,487,996,163

33.6%

Use)
682,177,027
(1973latest
date
available)
393,916,187

8.9%

Public
Utility

241,931,854

5.5%

Cigarette
Revenue

171,591,913

3.9%

Non Cook
County Real
Estate
Taxes
Motor
Fuel

Liquor

76,609,912

1.7%

ROT-Chap. Par. 451
120, Par.
440 et seq.
Par. 439 .112
SO-Chap.
120, Par.
439,101 et
seq.
Use-Chap. Par. 439 .12
120, Par.
439.1 et seq.
Chap. 120,
Par. 592.4

Chap. 120,
Par. 417
et seq.
Chap. 120,
Par. 468
Tax Chap.
120, Par.
453.1 et seq.
Use Tax
Chap. 120,
Par. 453.31
Chap. 43,
Par. 158
et seq.

Par. 434a
Par. 478
Par. 453.8
Par. 453.51
Par. 163c

* Illinois Department of Revenue Report to the taxpayers (fiscal 1975).

